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THE INFLUENCE OF STATE-LEVEL RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY 
INSTRUMENTS ON ELECTRICITY GENERATION IN THE UNITED STATES:  
A CROSS-SECTIONAL TIME SERIES ANALYSIS 
SUNJOO PARK 
ABSTRACT 
Since the late 1990s, state governments in the U.S. have diversified policy instruments 
for encouraging the electric power industry to deploy renewable sources for electricity 
generation. While observing the increasing number of new renewable energy policies at 
the state level governments, this study raised two research questions: (1) how do state 
governments intervene in the renewable energy market? and (2) how do various policy 
approaches taken by state governments affect renewable energy development? To answer 
for these questions, this study attempts to identify the trends and variations in renewable 
energy policy designs among states in terms of the combination of aggregate level policy 
instruments used by state authorities. Additionally, this study aims to examine and 
compare the effectiveness of policy instruments in the deployment of renewable energy 
sources for electricity production.  
This study examined 18 state legislative, renewable energy related regulations, 
programs, or financial incentives existing between 2001 and 2010 in 48 states. Those 18 
individual renewable energy policies were classified into three types of policy 
instruments: command-and-control, market-based, and information instruments. For the 
analysis, this study measured the amount and share of the electricity generation from non-
hydro renewable sources as renewable energy policy effects. In order to isolate policy 
effects, this study also considered state specific characteristics such as natural endowment, 
v 
 
economic and political environments, and the market conditions of electric power 
industries in different states.  
This study employed fixed-effects models to analyze cross-sectional time series 
data. The results showed that states’ adoption of diverse command-and-control types of 
policy instruments have significantly influenced the increase of both the amount and 
share of renewable electricity, while informative policy tools helped increase the share of 
renewable sources used by electric power producers. However, diversification of market- 
based policy instruments—especially financial incentives—did not significantly affect 
the increase of renewable electricity generation in states. Besides governmental 
intervention, state wealth and citizen interest in environmental issues played important 
roles in inducing more investment in renewable energy technologies. Also, natural gas 
price, wind speed, and states’ export of electricity determined the proportion of 
renewable electricity in states.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Since the late 1990s, state governments in the United States have restructured 
their electricity market systems to adopt numerous policies and programs that regulate the 
sources of power generation and promote renewable energy development. State 
governments began deregulating electricity market systems during the 1990s, believing 
that privatization of utility provision and competition between electricity utilities would 
enhance the efficiency of energy production and thus lower electricity rates. In reality, 
however, signs of market failure began to appear in the United States’ electricity market. 
Electricity rates rose across the states due to the monopolized (or oligopolized) electricity 
markets. Increasing energy dependence and lack of sustainable energy resources drove up 
the electricity rates.  Electricity production’s heavy dependence on fossil fuel also 
generated a significant amount of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, influencing global 
climate change.   
In the late 1990s, when the U.S. state governments re-regulated their electricity 
market, they magnified and diversified regulations and programs for promoting 
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renewable energy. During and after the restructuring of electricity market systems, new 
environmental policy instruments such as renewable portfolio standards (RPS) and 
performance-based incentives (“feed-in tariff”) have been increasingly adopted at the 
state level. For instance, the number of states that adopted mandatory renewable portfolio 
standards increased from only five in 2000 to 29 states and D.C. today.  Market-based 
incentives such as tax differentiation and marketable permits (cap-and-trade) have been 
proposed and implemented for purposes of cost efficiency and compliance. A state’s 
social and political contexts affect the policies designed and utilized within the state 
(Berry and Berry, 1990; Matisoff, 2008; Yi and Feiock, 2012), which, when used 
appropriately, could positively influence the outcome of its policies. However, recent 
renewable energy policies adopted by many states do not seem to explicitly reflect their 
social and policy contexts; at least not in any readily recognizable way.  Rather, the states’ 
latest renewable energy regulations and taxations seem to follow the national trend of 
emphasizing energy independence and novel environmental policy instruments. 
Throughout the United States, renewable energy policies at the state level have been 
increasing in magnitude as well as diversifying in terms of the types of policy instruments, 
generating considerable variation among states (Gan, Eskeland, and Kolshus, 2007). 
As the number of new renewable energy policies at the state level has increased, 
so have policy analyses and evaluations focusing on individual programs (Carley, 2009; 
Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011; Delmas, Montes-Sancho, and Shimshack, 2010; 
Menz and Vachon, 2006; Shrimali and Kniefel, 2011; Yin and Powers, 2010). 
Effectiveness of states’ renewable energy policies has not yet been entirely evaluated and 
understood (Carley, 2011). Moreover, no study has clearly examined how well various 
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renewable energy policy instruments work together (Carley, 2011). In order to trace and 
understand policy changes over time, categorization of policy instruments has been 
considered to be necessary as a step in developing an effective indicator (OECD, 2001; 
Persson, 2006; Richards, 2000). Analyzing the aggregate level policy instruments could 
provide an overview on the diversity of policy mixes, enabling the analysis of the 
effectiveness of each policy instrument and thus the development of optimal 
combinations of policy design (Lascoumes and Le Gales, 2007; Vedung, 1998).  
This research is expected to provide a perspective on the extent of U.S. states’ (as 
a whole and also as individuals) involvement in renewable energy deployment.  By 
comparing the magnitude of renewable energy policies/programs adopted and 
implemented over the last decade, the research will also show the variation in and 
changes of states’ interest in renewable energy development. Then, this study will 
categorize the renewable energy policies into three types based on coerciveness and 
behavioral assumptions: (1) command-and-control, (2) market-based, and (3) information 
policy instruments. Categorization of renewable energy policy instruments will be 
analyzed in relation to the states’ contexts of natural resource, economic and political 
circumstances, and electric power market conditions, which are considered as 
determinants of policy choices and implementation. This will provide explanations for 
the variation in renewable energy policy choices among states; such variation will be 
accounted for in the research design to control the determinants’ effect on renewable 
energy development.  
The primary purpose of this study is to identify the variation in renewable energy 
policy designs among states in terms of the combination of policy instruments used by 
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state authorities. This study additionally aims to examine the marginal effects of 
corresponding policy instruments. It will contribute to states’ policy designs by showing 
the overall trends of U.S. renewable energy policy adoptions at the state level.  It will 
offer a comprehensive overview of the evolution of energy policies since the 1990s in all 
of contiguous 48 states; which in turn will hopefully help states make better energy 
policy decisions in light of their own contextual variables.  In addition, this study will 
contribute to the body of knowledge of public policy instrument mixes and their 
effectiveness. 
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CHAPTER II 
RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICIES AND POLICY INSTRUMENTS 
 
 
2.1 Background of Renewable Energy Evolution in the United States 
In the history of renewable energy development in the world, the United States 
led the early development of renewable energy industries through federal level legislation 
beginning in the late 1970s. By the 1990s, however, European countries had 
outperformed the US in developing renewable energy markets. During this period, 
countries across Europe adopted and implemented a variety of policy instruments to 
develop renewable energy production. Examples of these policy instruments include 
national legislation such as Renewables Obligations (U.K.) or national quotas (Austria, 
Belgium, Italy, Denmark, and Sweden) (Haas, et al. 201; Reiche and Bechberger, 2004)1, 
as well as non-legislative instruments such as green pricing activities and self-obligations 
(Enzensberger, Wietschel, and Rentz 2002). In the meantime, state governments in the 
United States began electricity market restructuring and renewable energy development 
                                                          
1
 Detailed overviews on the national policy instruments promoting renewable energy development in 
Europe, IEA (1997) and Moore and Ihle (1999). 
 
6 
 
through innovative policy designs. The U.S.’s renewable electricity industry has 
expanded even more dramatically in the last few years with a Federal stimulus package 
given to states for the purpose of recovery from economic recession of 2008.  
The development of renewable energy policies in the United States features three 
distinct phases. The first phase is the birth of modern renewable electricity industry in the 
U.S. through Federal legislation from the late 1970s to the 1980s. Between the late 1980s 
and to early 1990s is the phase of stagnation in the growth of renewable energy industry 
in the U.S. Since the late 1990s, state governments opened the new era for renewable 
energy industry through innovative policy designs. The Federal enactment of the Public 
Utilities Regulatory Policy Act of 1978 (PURPA) started the first phase—the era of 
modern renewable energy industry. PURPA of 1978 required that electric utilities 
purchase power from qualifying third parties—meaning independent renewable energy 
generators or cogenerators—at the utilities’ “avoided cost” (Martinot, Wiser, and Hamrin, 
2005; Wiser, Pickle, and Goldman, 1998). This was the first use of a “feed-in” policy that 
offered electric utilities to purchase renewable electricity at the projected wholesale cost 
of conventional or fossil-fuel electricity, which approximately equals the “avoided costs” 
to the utilities.  
Since the 1990s, European countries chose feed-in tariffs as a popular strategy to 
promote generation of electricity from renewables. Germany, Denmark, Italy, Austria, 
France, and Netherlands have adopted feed-in tariffs as their main electricity support 
schemes, combined with quota obligations or other tax incentives (Haas, et al., 2011). 
Their feed-in prices are usually fixed by law for each renewable energy technologies 
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and/or set based on a certain percentage of the average electricity price (Martinot, Wiser, 
and Hamrin, 2005). 
In response to the PURPA of 1978, several states developed ‘standard offer’ 
contracts, long-term contracts at a fixed tariff open to renewable power plants. California 
succeeded in development of its renewable energy industry through its aggressive 
implementation of PURPA along with generous state and federal tax incentives in the 
1980s (Wiser, Pickle, and Goldman, 1998). 
However, various tax incentives given to renewable energy industry were 
eliminated in the late 1980s and renewable energy markets remained stagnant in the 
following decade. Several reasons contributed to the declined interest in renewable 
energy: Fossil fuel prices, especially natural gas prices, dropped drastically and electric 
power utilities no longer had incentives to enter into ‘standard offer’ contracts because 
feed-in tariffs based on avoided cost declined (Martinot, Wiser, and Hamrin, 2005). 
In addition, electric power markets began restructuring at both the federal and 
state levels in the early 1990s. The electric power sectors were forced to reorganize their 
systems into competitive regimes, including competitive wholesale markets and retail 
power competition along with unbundling of generation, transmission, and distribution. 
Developers in electric power industries deferred their decision of investment until the 
completion of electricity market restructuring and the preparation of final rules (Martinot, 
Wiser, and Hamrin, 2005). 
In the late 1990s, however, a new era for renewable energy began in the United 
States. While electric power markets lost their taste for the federal level incentives under 
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the PURPA of 1978, a number of new renewable energy policies were adopted at the 
state level in the process of the electricity market restructuring. Examples of state level 
policies driving renewable energy development included state tax and financial incentives, 
wholesale market rules, renewable portfolio standards (RPS), voluntary purchases of 
green power, and information disclosure. State governments’ designs for renewable 
energy policy vary considerably in magnitude and diversity of policy instruments adopted.   
Energy industries also have continued to deploy renewable energy technologies 
and reduce carbon emission voluntarily with the encouragement of federal financial 
incentives such as production (PTC) and investment tax credits (ITC) or grants in lieu 
(Section 1603) for renewable energy. In addition to the Public Utility Regulatory Policies 
Act of 1978 (PURPA), the Federal Production Tax Credit and Renewable Energy 
Production Incentive created under the Energy Policy Act of 1992 also contributed to the 
development of renewable energy industry (Bird, et al., 2005; Menz and Vachon, 2006). 
Facing the 2008 financial crisis, the U.S. Congress enacted the Energy Improvement and 
Extension Act of 2008 and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 
2009. §1603 program under ARRA, administered by the Department of Treasury in 
conjunction with the Department of Energy, offers cash grants in lieu of tax credits to 
renewable energy project developers. Section 1603 program aims to help expansion of 
investment in large solar and wind energy projects (Steinberg, Porro, and Goldberg, 
2012).  
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2.1.1 Definition of Renewable Energy Policy 
For the purpose of this study, “renewable energy” is restricted to the electricity 
production sector (also exchangeable with supply or generation) side and pertains only to 
the on-grid electricity generated from renewable resources, which excludes non-
electricity energy use such as transportation or other methods to secure energy supply 
such as energy efficiency.  
According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA)’s Energy 
Glossary, renewable energy resources (or renewables) are “energy resources that are 
naturally replenishing but flow-limited; inexhaustible in duration but limited in the 
amount of energy available per unit of time.” Renewable energy resources for electricity 
generation, in general, include hydro, solar, wind, biomass2, geothermal3, ocean thermal, 
wave action, and tidal action.4  Conventional sources of electricity generation – 
petroleum, natural gas, coal are excluded from renewables in this study. This study also 
excludes the “advanced energy technologies”5 from the scope of renewable energy 
sources.  
Policy instruments aimed at promoting renewable energy generation consist of 
legislative instruments implemented by governmental authorities and non-legislative 
instruments supported by market players (Enzensberger, et al., 2002). Renewable energy 
                                                          
2
 Biomass is non-fossil material of biological origin such as wood and combustible renewable and waste 
(International Energy Agency). Solid biomass, liquid biomass, biogas, industrial and municipal wastes 
consist of renewable energy resource of biomass (EIA).   
3
 Electricity can be generated from heat (hot water or steam) under the Earth’s surface. 
4
 EIA’s Energy Glossary, http://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.cfm. 
5
 Ohio’s Energy Bill (Senate Bill 221), passed in 2008, includes the “Alternative Energy Portfolio 
Standard,” which considers “renewable energy” and “advanced energy” as alternative energy technologies 
to meet the mandated goal for electricity generators and suppliers. “Advanced energy” includes clean coal, 
advanced nuclear, fuel cells, energy efficiency, etc. The renewable energy in this study excludes the 
sources and technologies defined as “advanced energy.”  
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policies that are discussed in this study stand for the legislative instruments including 
government mechanisms, efforts, and measures to promote the process of electricity 
production from renewable energy resources.  
2.1.2 Goals of Renewable Energy Policy 
This section reviews the policy goals that current renewable energy policies are 
intended to accomplish. The common goal of renewable energy policies can be simply 
stated to use more renewable energy technologies. There are, however, various goals that 
governments expect renewable energy to achieve (Komor and Bazilian, 2005). Komor 
and Bazilian (2005) define three broad goals of renewable energy policies: energy goals 
(energy supply security, energy price volatility reduction, and low energy price), 
environmental goals (pollution reduction and environmental sustainability promotion), 
and economic and industrial development goals (local/regional economic development, 
domestic employment increase). Beck and Martinot (2004) classify currently 
implemented renewable energy policies pertaining to their primary policy goals: 
renewable energy promotion, transport biofuels, emission reduction, power sector 
restructuring, distributed generation, and rural electrification policies.  
This study is to select a policy goal and analyze and compare the effectiveness of 
different types of policy instruments aiming at the same goal. Governments develop 
different policy designs and combinations of various policy instruments to meet different 
policy goals. Expected policy outcomes vary depending on policy goals because they 
strongly influence the effectiveness of policy implementation. Depending on its stated 
goals, different indicators are needed to measure the achievement of given policy goals. 
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Governments often adopt renewable energy policies with various implicit and explicit 
objectives. Depending on the definition of the goal of renewable energy policy, the 
output measures of renewable energy development vary among net renewable electricity 
generation, renewable electricity purchase, renewable electricity consumption, etc. 
This study limits its scope of analysis to the renewable energy policies aiming at 
promotion of the production of electricity from renewable resources. The entire range of 
legislative regulations, programs and incentives that the U.S. state governments have 
adopted and implemented to directly and indirectly support electricity generation from 
renewable resources are found in the analysis section of this study. This study analyzes 
in-state renewable electricity generation from all types of power producers. There are 
various electric producers consisting of utility and nonutility power producers that 
generate and transmit (purchase and distribute) electricity. Not all electric producers, 
however, generate renewable electricity to meet the mandated goal set by legislative 
authority, such as renewable portfolio standards. Instead, they may purchase renewable 
electricity generated from other states through transmission. An electric utility is a 
corporation, agency, authority, person, or other legal entity delivering electric energy 
primarily for commercial, industrial, and residential use. Electric utilities include 
publicly-owned utilities such as municipal and state utilities, Federal electric utilities, 
investor-owned utilities which are privately owned entities, and cooperative electric 
utilities. In the United States, there are more than 3,233 electric utilities, ensuring a 
reliable source of electricity to all consumers as of 2010 (EIA, 2012b, p.311). As of 2007, 
210 investor-owned electric utilities represented about 38% of utility installed capacity, 
42 % of electricity generation and served about 71% of ultimate consumers (EIA, 2007). 
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Nonutility power generation refers to electric generation by end-users, or small power 
producers. Nonutility power producers include independent power producers, qualifying 
co-generators, and small power producers. About 1,738 nonutility power producers exist 
across the nation. Independent power producers (IPP) operate within the territories of 
host utilities and must use renewable as a primary source of electricity generation. They 
do not sell electricity on the retail market; instead they sell electricity on the wholesale 
market at non-regulated prices (EIA, 2007). They do not file forms listed in the Code of 
Federal Regulations, Title 18, Part 141. 
2.2 Public Policy Instruments 
2.2.1 Definition of Public Policy Instruments  
This section addresses the importance of policy instruments in practical public 
policy design, implementations, and studies. Public policy instruments are defined as “a 
set of techniques by which governmental authorities—or proxies acting on behalf of 
governmental authorities—wield their power in attempting to ensure support and effect 
social change” (Vedung, 1998). With the same policy goal, the result could be different 
depending on the policy instruments that the governments choose to implement, which 
determines the mechanisms for enforcement. “The use of various policy instruments for 
governance purposes will probably have different consequences on the nature of 
addressee responses” (Vedung, 1998).  
Policy instrument choice affects the level of responsible government and types of 
institution. Policies enacted at the Federal government (or national government) level 
generally require a great degree of complexity and consensus. Policies that influence and 
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utilize natural resources tend to be assigned to the state and regional levels (Bernstein, 
1993). A World Bank report (Bernstein, 1993) suggested several lessons about alternative 
approaches to designing environmental policy, after the successful models of developed 
countries. Market-based instruments (or economic incentives) cannot replace command-
and-control (or regulatory) instruments nor be effectively implemented without pre-
existing standards.  
Bernstein (1993) calls for further studies to 1) evaluate the effectiveness of 
various regulatory and economic instruments; 2) analyze the circumstances under which 
(economic) policy instruments can be successfully implemented; and 3) suggest the 
appropriate combination of policy instruments for developing countries. Also, Bernstein 
(1993) points out the importance of compatibility of new environmental policy 
instruments mixes with given political, economic, administrative, and judicial conditions 
as well as consistency with overall environmental policy.  
Bennear and Stavins (2007) justified optimal implementation of multiple policy 
instruments in pursuit of a policy goal. They argued that for different types of problems 
under different environments, different instruments are appropriate. The use of “hybrid” 
instruments that combine a quantity and a price instrument has been explored recently.  
The authors asserted that multiple policy instruments could be optimal under the 
circumstances where multiple constraints exist such as political constraints, market 
failures, or policy failures. They framed that multiple constraints prevent attainment of 
multiple Pareto optimality, so that adjustment of one constraint (use of one type of policy 
instrument) does not enhance welfare (Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956). Therefore, market 
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failures generated from multiple constraints can be “jointly ameliorating,” “jointly 
reinforcing,” or “neutral” through second-best policy making. 
In the contemporary public policy environment of governance, policy instruments 
have undergone development and diversification. However, diversification and 
magnification of policy instruments without supportive evidence of their effectiveness 
through carefully designed and conducted evaluation of given policy instrument mixes or 
combinations do not guarantee governments better to achieve policy goals. Another topic 
to explore concerns the conditions and context under which a particular combination of 
policy instruments would be utilized and appropriate (Bennear and Stavins, 2007; 
Howlett, 2004).  
Vedung (1998) argues that empirical evaluations of the effectiveness of governing 
instruments constitute a valid test of classification schemes for policy instruments. Also, 
the theoretical issues addressed in policy instruments theories help raise important 
research questions for future empirical evaluation. For example, what policy instruments 
are mixed and combined in horizontal6 and vertical dimensions? What are the variables 
affecting the choice of policy instruments in organizational, political, and social (cultural) 
contexts? How does a chosen policy instrument affect public’s receptiveness of the 
programs, the politics of policy implementations, and the effectiveness and efficiency of 
government programs or policies (Vedung, 1998)? This study applies empirical analysis 
in a quest to answer these crucial research questions.  
 
                                                          
6
 Vedung (1998) refers the “horizontal packaging of policy instruments as the use of combined instruments 
for the same purpose. 
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2.2.2 Categorization of Public Policy Instruments – Typology of Policy Instruments 
Although interest in policy instrumentation and policy mixes has increased, there 
exists limited policy analysis and public administration literature about a general and 
universal classification of policy instruments. The basis of the classification of policy 
instruments, however, can be found in literature, which discusses the general features of 
policy instruments and their relevance to the classification of renewable energy policy 
instruments.  
The definitions of the types of policy instruments vary based on differing 
assumptions. This section reviews a previous literature that discusses classificatory 
schemes of policy instruments and the basis of policy instrument classification. 
Categories depend upon the defining features of each study, from a dichotomous 
approach such as regulation and incentives to six types. The traditional distinction divides 
policy instruments into either regulatory versus market-based or economic instruments 
(Bernstein, 1993; Callan and Thomas, 2004; Harrington, Morgenstern, and Sterner, 2004; 
Stavins, 1991). Discussions about market-based approach or economic instruments began 
since the 1980s through 1990s as an alternative approach to command-and-control type 
of environmental policy initiatives. Economists incorporated the market-based approach 
into the environmental policy such as pollution control, sewage and waste management, 
and energy conservation. Using economic incentives, market-based instruments are 
designed to allow polluters more flexibility to respond according to their own self-
interests (Callan and Thomas, 2004; Harrington et al., 2004).  
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Schneider and Ingram (1990) classify policy tools into five groups based on the 
behavioral characteristics of each policy tool. They emphasize the importance of the 
motivational devices embedded in policy tools that empower people. Policies implicitly 
guide people to take actions that conform to policy goals. With well-designed policy tools, 
people might comply with policy rules, utilize the policy opportunities, or take self-
initiated action. Schneider and Ingram (1990) point out five reasons that people do not 
take actions: (1) lack of authority of law to direct them, (2) lack of incentives, (3) lack of 
capacity, (4) disagreement with the implicit value of policy goals, and (5) high level of 
uncertainty. They define five policy tools addressing those five reasons—authority, 
incentive, capacity, symbolic and hortatory, and learning tools—and argue that the policy 
tools reflect the political culture. Vedung (1998) and OECD (1994) define policy 
instruments with a trifold classificatory scheme: regulation (the stick), economic means 
(the carrot), and information (the sermon) based on the degree of authoritative force 
involved. Vedung (1998) embodies Etzioni (1975)’s work7 as a basis of the trifold 
scheme of policy instruments. There is an assumption that policy instrument choice is 
related to a society’s dominant political and administrative ideologies and strategies. 
Vedung (1998) attempts to characterize policy instruments with three defining properties: 
(1) coercion, (2) the use of material resources, and (3) intellectual or moral appeals.  
The degree of the coerciveness characterizes policy instruments (Linder and Peter, 
1987; Salamon, 2002; Vedung, 1998). The degree of coerciveness measures the extent to 
which a tool set by governments can intervene in and restrict individual or group 
                                                          
7
 Etzioni (1975) claims three kinds of power which are means to control subject to comply and to achieve 
organizational purposes. He defines coercive, renumerative, and normative power as means for control 
purposes.  
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behavior as opposed to merely encouraging or discouraging it (Doern and Phidd, 1983; 
Salamon, 2002). There is at least some degree of coerciveness involved in most forms of 
governmental intervention. Based on the extent to which policies rely on this, however, 
individual policies can be grouped together (Salamon, 2002). Salamon (2002) classifies 
illustrative policy tools into three groups by degree of coerciveness—high, medium, and 
low— and hypothesizes likely impacts of policy tools according to the degree of coercion. 
Social and economic regulations are considered highly coercive instruments imposing 
formal limitations on undesirable activities. Market-based approaches of policy 
instruments that involve a medium degree of coerciveness include grants, loans, subsidies, 
and corrective taxes. Tax expenditures are considered less coercive. Information and 
voluntary instruments have the least coerciveness (Doern and Phidd, 1983; Salamon, 
2002). In addition, Doern and Phidd (1983) further discuss that government corporations 
and government purchase of assets represent policy tools involving the maximum degree 
of coerciveness. Salamon (2002) expects that all other things being equal, more coercive 
tools are more effective, based on previous policy implementation literature, 
Some studies categorize policy instruments based on their functional features 
(Lascoumes and Le Gales, 2007; OECD, 2001). Lascoumes and Le Gales (2007) 
categorize the types of policy instruments into five groups: (1) legislative and regulatory, 
(2) economic and fiscal, (3) agreement based and incentive based, (4) communication 
based and information based, (5) de jure and de facto standards instruments. OECD 
(2001) claims that appropriate “policy packages” need to be well designed to deal with 
market failure and achieve environmental goals. OECD (2001; 2003a) classifies the 
environmental policy instruments into six types:  (1) regulatory instruments, (2) 
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economic instruments, (3) liability and damage compensation8, (4) education and 
information, (5) voluntary, and (6) management and planning.  
Three categories of policy instruments—command-and-control, market-based, 
and information instruments—are not only found in the trifold scheme of policy 
instruments (Vedung, 1998; OECD, 2001), but also commonly used in other literature 
categorizing policy instruments with a typology containing five or six categories 
(Lascoumes and Le Gales, 2007, Mickwitz, 2003; Salamon, 2002; Schneider and Ingram, 
1990). These studies add several categories to the existing command-and-control, 
economic means, and information instruments. Additional categories other than trifold 
schemes such as education or planning, however, are not exclusive and distinct in their 
behavioral assumption and authoritative coerciveness. An empirical study that classifies 
and evaluates policy instruments on a certain issue needs a classificatory theme which is 
exclusive among categories and applicable to a variety of issues. In that, three categories 
of command-and-control, economic incentives, and information instruments represent 
effective renewable energy policies classification. This study employs Vedung (1998)’s 
definition of three types of policy instruments and applies the defining property of each 
instrument based on the coerciveness (Vedung, 1998) and behavioral assumptions 
(Schneider and Ingram, 1990) to the classification of renewable energy policies. Figure 1 
illustrates the three types of policy instruments that this study refers to for the analysis. 
 
 
                                                          
8
 In OECD (2001) report, one of six policy instruments is “incentives for technological development and 
diffusion.” OECD (2003a) refers its report in 2001, but it changes incentives for technology to liability and 
damage compensation. 
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Figure 1. Basic Trifold Typology of Policy Instruments 
 
Command-and-Control Policy Instruments 
Policy instruments implemented by governmental units to influence targets 
through authoritative means are defined as command-and-control (regulatory) 
instruments. Under the command-and-control policy, target persons or agents respond to 
what they are told by the controllers. This policy instrument modifies the set of options of 
agents face in their choice sets of alternative actions by formulating rules and directives, 
and setting supervisory systems (OECD, 1994; Schneider & Ingram, 1990; Vedung, 
1998). The defining property of command-and-control (or regulation) instruments is the 
authoritative nature in the relationship between controller/government agency and target 
population (Vedung, 1998).9 Subtypes of command-and-control policy instruments 
include performance and process standards, licenses/permits, bans, and zoning 
(Gunningham and Sinclair, 1999; Vedung, 1998).  
Although command-and-control instruments have been criticized for their 
inefficiency due to relatively higher administrative costs and less flexibility given to 
                                                          
9
 The term regulation defined in this paper is different with some definitions frequently used in the U.S., 
which include all types of government intervention and political control (Meier, 1985; Vedung, 1998). 
Policy Instruments
Command-and-Control Market-Based Information
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market players, the components of these instruments such as rules, standards, and 
regulations are still believed to provide higher certainty of policy outcomes compared to 
economic principles or suasion (Harrington, et al., 2004; Weimer and Vinning, 1999).  A 
wide applicability of regulatory instruments partially accounts for the effectiveness of 
regulatory instruments (Campbell, Johnson, and Larson, 2004). 
Market-Based Instruments 
In an effort to convince people to find the government-desired behavior more 
economically attractive than the undesired one, governments try to alter the market 
conditions or economic frameworks through economic instruments (Enzensberger, et al., 
2002). Underneath the market-based approach or economic instruments lies an 
assumption that individuals are utility maximizers who take opportunities to make 
choices in their own best interests. Incentive instruments rely on tangible pay-offs to 
motivate target people to comply with or utilize policies. Tangible pay-offs here refer to 
money, life, and liberty, to name a few. State governments usually offer (positive) 
monetary benefit as incentives for renewable energy development (Schneider and Ingram, 
1990). Economic policy instruments alter the costs or benefits for the target persons or 
agents, but the target agents are not obligated to comply with and use the measures 
involved. The most suitable use of economic and market-based policy instruments 
involves cases where the policy fosters long-term development in a given market place 
rather than risking a disaster management (Enzensberger, et al, 2002). Economic 
instruments include charges, subsidies, grants, and loans operated with a medium degree 
of coercion on public units; also, tax expenditures such as tax credits, deductions, and 
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exemptions are considered relatively less coercive economic incentives (Vedung, 1998; 
OECD, 1994; Salamon, 2002).  
Ever since the demonstration of benefits and cost effectiveness of market-based 
policy instruments, a growing consensus has been made over the advantage of applying 
market-based instruments to environmental areas such as greenhouse gas emissions, 
renewable energy development, waste management, and natural resources (Hammar, 
2006).  Even though cost effectiveness in the implementation process marks the market-
based instruments’ strength, it does not guarantee a better achievement of policy goals. In 
other words, when it comes to policy outcomes or policy effectiveness, market-based 
policy instruments might not deliver as much as policy makers expect them to (Hammar, 
2006). 
Information Instrument 
The third category of policy instruments is information instruments10 which 
influence target people through knowledge transfer, communication, and persuasion. 
Information instruments assume that lack of information and skills prevents potential 
targets from making the best decision possible. If target agents are informed, they will 
choose the preferred alternative policy (Schneider and Ingram, 1990).  
There are two types of information regarding policy instruments: information as 
and information on. One is information as a policy instrument as itself. The other is 
“metapolicy instrument” which is used to convey the knowledge of other policy 
instruments’ existence, availability, and meaning (Vedung, 1998). Vedung (1998) calls 
                                                          
10
 Schneider and Ingram (1990) defined information, training, and education as capacity tools. Vedung 
(1998) used the term “sermons,” and OECD (1994) called it as “suasive instrument.” 
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the latter type of information, “information on policy instruments.” Information 
instruments are regarded as modern forms of governmental intervention and the least 
coercive instruments, which is called a sermon or exhortation (Vedung, 1998). This paper 
deals with both types of information—information on policy instruments and as policy 
instruments, which influence electricity generation from renewable sources and classify 
them into information instruments.  
Stavins (2003) argues that information programs help economic instruments more 
effectively solve the environmental problems because they empower producers and 
consumers to make rational choices.  Well-informed producers and consumers constitute 
a crucial characteristic of well-functioning markets. This study discusses two types of 
information programs. One is product labeling requirements which provide consumers 
the information set. According to the reporting requirements, producers must make their 
products’ information and manufacturing process publically available. Reported 
information helps increase public awareness of producer’s activities and prompts the 
producers to operate more transparently (Stephan, 2002). 
Information instruments complement other policy instruments by helping people 
understand and interpret other policy instruments. Information instruments encourage 
people to comply with regulations or take advantage of available services (Weiss, 2002).   
Based on the discussion above, this study hypothesizes a positive correlation 
between a state’s use of information instruments and the likelihood of developing more 
renewable energy. In addition, information instruments in conjunction with other policy 
instruments are expected to push the deployment of states’ renewable electricity.  
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2.2.3 Policy Mixes 
Direct regulation or command-and-control instruments were the predominant 
means of government intervention in environmental policy until the 1990s. In recent 
years, however, shortcomings of direct regulation such as diminishing effectiveness and 
increasing costs have prompted neoliberal ideas to gain a larger influence over 
environmental policy and natural resources management. A wider range of policy 
instruments has been proposed as regulatory alternatives (Baldwin and Cave, 1999; 
Gunningham and Sinclair, 1999; OECD, 2002). They include process-based regulation, 
economic instruments, financial incentives, information disclosure, self-regulation, and 
voluntarism (Gunningham and Sinclair, 1999; Cho, 2008). New market-based 
environmental policy instruments have been viewed more favorably. Economic or 
market-based instruments incentivize polluters/target population to act in ways stipulated 
by policy goals. Economic incentives are considered to be more flexible and cost-
effective instruments compared to traditional command-and-control instruments (Bailey, 
2007; Bernstein, 1993). 
Interest in “policy mixes,” or combining policy instruments, has been increasing 
since the 1990s (OECD, 2001; Persson, 2006; Sorrell and Sijm, 2003). The following 
reasons account for the preference for a policy design combining different types of policy 
instruments over a single instrument. Combined policy instruments complement and 
reinforce each other to enhance the overall effectiveness and efficiency of policy 
implementation compared to a single instrument (Rist, 1998). In reality, environmental 
problems tend to be too complex to solve with a single strategy (Gunningham and 
Sinclair, 1999). Selecting the most appropriate combination of instruments comprises a 
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crucial component of a policy design that would maximize the goal achievement and 
minimize political economic costs (Peters, 2002).  
2.3 Classification of Renewable Energy Policies 
This section reviews the policies and incentives that state governments in the U.S. 
developed to promote electricity generation and distribution from renewable sources. 
These are 18 state renewable energy policy instruments and incentives which are 
classified into three categories of policy instruments: command-and-control, market-
approach, and information instruments. These three policy instruments are derived from 
both the previous literature that categorizes renewable energy policies and the general 
policy instruments classification. Categorization of the renewable energy policy 
instruments, adopted in the United Sates at the state level, enables one to trace the trends 
of how the United States has employed its policies for promoting renewable energy over 
the past decade.  
Classification of renewable energy policies is conducted based on the criteria 
discussed in the previous section. Policies that use authoritative tools to motivate people 
to respond to and comply with policy goals belong in the category of command-and-
control instruments. Market-based instruments are policies and programs that motivate 
and incentivize people with tangible trade-offs. Information instruments attempt to 
influence people to act voluntarily by knowledge transfer and communication.  
Some previous empirical studies (Beck and Martinot, 2004; Enzensberger, et al., 
2002; Jonstone, Hascic, and Popp, 2008; Menz, 2005) classify renewable energy policies 
and programs into several groups. These groups trace state governments’ policy design 
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trends. Enzensberger, et al. (2002) divide legislative instruments for renewable energy 
development into regulatory and economic instruments. In addition, they distinguish 
economic instruments into supply-push and demand-pull approaches in the context of 
renewable energy fostering projects. A supply-push approach includes renewable energy 
policy instruments that influence the electricity price or production costs of renewable 
electricity (feed-in tariffs, tax advantages, subsidies for investment). Demand-pull 
approach fixes a certain demand—i.e. a certain percentage of the total electricity 
generation (or consumption) from renewable—by obliging market industry 
(Enzensberger et al., 2002). 
Menz (2005) describes state level renewable energy policies with three 
distinctions based on the means and degree of authoritative intervention: state financial 
incentives, state rules and regulations, and voluntary measures. Beck and Martinot (2004) 
and Jonstone, Hascic, and Popp (2008) also classify renewable energy policies into three 
categories: price-setting and quantity-forcing policies (RPS, REC), investment cost 
reduction policies (rebate, tax relief, grant, loan), and public investment and market 
facilitation activities (PBFs, industry support, contractor certification, equipment 
standards, disclosure, access laws, government procurement). These categories differ 
from Menz’s (2005) in that the function of each instrument defines them.  
This study overviews states’ policies in support of renewable energy development 
and classifies those individual policies into three categories—command-and-control, 
market-based approach, and information instruments. The defining features used to 
classify renewable energy policies are the degree of authoritative forces (Vedung, 1998; 
OECD, 1994; Salamon, 2002) combined with the behavioral assumptions that determine 
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the relationship between government and target population (Vedung, 1998; Schneider & 
Ingram, 1990).  
2.3.1 Command-and-Control 
In this study, five renewable energy policies or programs are identified as the 
command-and-control instruments: (1) green power purchasing programs, (2) renewable 
portfolio standards, (3) public benefit funds, (4) interconnection, and (5) contractor 
licensing. 
Green Power Purchasing Programs 
Many state and local governments purchase a certain percentage of their 
electricity consumption from renewable sources or buy renewable energy credits (RECs). 
Governments, businesses, schools, residents, and NPOs can enter into contracts with 
green power marketers or developers through utility green power programs or community 
aggregation (DSIRE, 2010). No mandates for governmental units to consume their 
electricity from renewable sources existed before 2000. As of October 2010, nine states 
had green power purchasing programs, while the federal government had a green power-
purchasing goal. This program entails government entities directly purchasing renewable 
energy. State governments, through authority bested in them, also set the amount or 
percentage of the consumption of electricity generated from renewable sources. The 
green power purchasing program carries high degree of coerciveness.  
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Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) 
 RPSs require electric utilities to own or acquire renewable energy or renewable 
energy credits (RECs) to account for a certain percentage or amount of its generating 
capacity or retail electricity sales according to a specific timeframe. Only six states had 
adopted RPS with mandatory or voluntary goals in 1998. As of August 2010, 29 states 
and the D.C. had legally binding RPSs, seven of which had renewable portfolio goals. 
Today, RPS is considered the most important and popular policy to promote renewable 
energy development at the state level. Numerous previous literatures have described RPS 
as a “market-friendly” policy instrument (Wiser, Namovicz, Gielecki, and Smith, 2007). 
RPS, however, is closer to a command-and-control type of policy instrument because it 
restricts eligible renewable technologies and requires electricity producers to adopt a 
specific technology to increase supply and/or demand of renewable energy (Delmas and 
Montes-Sancho, 2011). In regard to the quantity-based obligation set by states, the RPS is 
defined as a command-and-control type of policy instrument with a high degree of 
coerciveness.11 Since RPS includes few market dimensions, the key to policy success 
depends on policy implementation and enforcement (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973). 
RPS is relatively easy to implement in terms of political dimension because its effect 
starts after its enactment/adoption.  
 
 
                                                          
11
 Use of tradable renewable energy credits in the process of RPS implementation is considered a market-
based mechanism to provide flexibility and compliance costs. 
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Public Benefit Fund (PBF) / System Benefit Charge (SBC) 
During the state level electric utility restructuring in the late 1990s, public benefit 
funds (PBFs) were developed through a surcharge on electricity consumption and were 
used for rebate and loan programs, R&D, and energy education programs (DSIRE, 2010; 
Doris, McLaren, Healey, and Hockett, 2009). The PBF is categorized as a command-and-
control instrument in this study. The states impose a certain amount of surcharge on all 
consumers of electricity and re-allocate the collected funds between renewable energy 
and energy efficiency. Therefore, public benefit funds are more likely considered a social 
regulation rather than an economic policy instrument. Among the 18 states and D.C. that 
implement PBFs as of August of 2010, 14 states had already created PBF before 2000 
(EPA, 2007; Doris, et al., 2009).   
Contractor Licensing 
As of October 2010, 15 states have adopted and implemented contractor licensing 
requirements for renewable energy development (DSIRE, 2010). Contractors who want 
to install renewable energy can get specific licensing, which guarantees proper 
installation and maintenance of renewable energy by standardizing the contractors’ 
experience and knowledge. Beck and Martinot (2009) explain that certificate requirement 
policy, such as contractor licensing, improves the efficiency of the renewable energy 
systems by ensuring uniform quality of equipment installation. However, there has been 
limited impact analysis on it so far. Contractor licensing is a typical command-and-
control policy instrument. Twelve states granted contractor licenses in 1998, and 15 states 
have currently implemented licensing.   
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Interconnection Standards 
Interconnection standards are a process standard which falls under the command-
and-control type of policy instrument. The standards control the technical and procedural 
process through which customers connect to electricity grids. The Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) adopts standards for the transmission level, while the 
state public utility commissions (e.g. PUCO) establish standards for interconnection to 
the distribution grids (DSIRE, 2010).  
In 1999, six states implemented interconnection standards. Over the last decade, 
most of the U.S. states have adopted interconnection standards (43 states and D.C. as of 
August 2010). Interconnection standards can remove market barriers to renewable energy 
development, and their design and implementation ensure a stable, safe, and economical 
connection to the electricity grid.  
2.3.2 Market-Based Instruments 
 Financial incentives reduce the initial cost or the operating cost of renewable 
technologies in order to make renewable technologies more attractive than conventional 
technologies (Menz and Vachon, 2006).12 Eleven programs and incentives for renewable 
energy development were placed in the market-based approach instruments in this study: 
net-metering, rebates, grants, loans, production incentives, and five tax expenditures.  
 
 
                                                          
12
 Conventional technologies for electricity generation have relatively low capital costs and high operating 
costs, whereas capital costs of renewable electricity sources are relatively high while its operating costs are 
low.  
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Net-Metering 
Net-metering allows for electricity to flow from and to the customer. Electricity 
from the customer flows back to the grid when customers generate electricity that 
exceeds their consumption: this offsets electricity consumed by the customer because it 
uses the excess generation (DSIRE, 2010).  Net-metering is considered a market-based 
policy instrument in this study because net-metering creates a niche market for on-site 
renewable energy generation, benefiting the customer (Forsyth, Tu, and Gilbert, 2000). 
Under PURPA of 1978, electricity consumers in states without net-metering programs 
have little financial incentives to invest in renewable energy systems: small wind or solar 
electric system owners were considered qualifying facilities, and were paid only utilities’ 
avoided fuel cost for their excess generation. Despite variation in the treatment of 
consumers’ net excess generation among states, states with net-metering can buy back net 
excess generation at higher rates, from wholesale to retail rates, than in states without net-
metering (Forsyth, et al., 2000). This creates more attractive financial incentives to 
consumers to produce electricity through grid-connected renewable energy systems. 
While only 21 states had adopted the net-metering system in 1998, 43 states and D.C. 
implemented net-metering policies as of October 2010. Many states adopted rules for net 
metering for renewable energy systems as part of the states’ electric-industry 
restructuring. 
Renewable Energy Access Laws 
Solar and wind access laws are established to protect a right to install and operate 
renewable energy systems at homes or facilities. Some states protect the property rights 
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to solar access through legislation13. Others allow parties to voluntarily enter into solar 
easement contracts. UNEP (2004) considers property rights as being resident in the 
spectrum of economic instruments. Property rights constitute a baseline for the 
functioning of many economic instruments and also serve as an environmental instrument. 
May (2002) defines property rights as economic instruments used to implement social 
regulation.  Fourteen states had implemented access laws in 1998, and 39 states have 
established renewable energy access laws as of August 2010. 
Rebate Programs 
Rebates programs provide the funding for solar or photovoltaic systems to 
promote the installation of renewable energy systems. As of August 2010, 27 states and 
D.C. had state-level rebate programs. As a market incentive, rebates reduce the cost of 
renewable energy installations. Rebates are flexible to the market changes because they 
represent relatively short-term policies to a specific project.  
Grant Programs 
States provide grant programs to assist the installation of equipment or systems by 
lowering the cost or encouraging the R&D of renewable technologies. Grant programs 
are available for the commercial, industrial, utility, education and government sectors. In 
1998, 12 states operated grant programs for renewable energy development. By 2010, 22 
states had grants as economic incentives. Grants are considered a market approach 
instrument, as they reduce high up-front costs with renewable energy installations and 
thus help small, customer-sited projects.  
                                                          
13
 Such as Arizona and Delaware 
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Loan Programs 
Most of the states—to be exact, 42 states—use state loan programs to finance the 
purchase of renewable energy systems or equipment. Loan rates and terms are 
determined on an individual project basis.  
Renewable Energy Production Incentives 
Production incentives, or performance-based incentives (PBIs), provide cash 
payments based on the amount of electricity generated by a renewable energy system.14 
Only one state had production incentives in 1998, and fourteen states have implemented 
performance-based incentives as of August 2010.15  
Tax Expenditures: Corporate, Industry, Personal, Property, and Sales Tax Incentives 
States offer five categories of tax incentives for renewable energy development: 
corporate, industry, personal, property, and sales tax incentives. Corporate tax incentives 
are available when corporations purchase and install renewable energy and equipment. 
States offer industry tax credits, exemptions, or grants to recruit or develop renewable 
energy systems and equipment. States offer personal income tax credits and deductions to 
reduce the expenses of buying and installing renewable energy systems. Property tax 
incentives exclude the additional cost of the renewable energy system more than a 
conventional heating system in the property assessment. Sales tax incentives provide an 
exemption from or refund of the state sales tax for the purchase of renewable energy 
systems. Tax incentives have been adopted since the early stage of renewable energy 
                                                          
14
 The “feed-in tariff” is a production incentive. Payments based on actual performances are more effective 
to ensure project quality.  
15
 There is a federal renewable energy production incentive (REPI) established in 1992. 
33 
 
development. More than half of all states currently provide mixed tax expenditure as 
market instruments.  
Tax expenditures or abatements can be important for renewable energy 
developers because renewable energy facilities are usually capital-intensive and financial 
incentives from tax abatements help developers to make decision to build and invest 
energy facilities. However, those tax exemptions may not be sufficient to stimulate new 
renewable energy development (Bird, et al., 2005). This is because a one-time tax benefit 
at the time of equipment purchase or installation is not sufficient for developers to decide 
investment for new facilities. Also, there is a concern regarding the use of tax exemptions 
due to possible reduction in tax revenues, which may interfere with the local economic 
development (Bird et al. 2005).  
2.3.3 Information Policy Instrument 
Required Green Power Option  
Green power option requires and encourages electric utilities to offer customers 
the options of purchasing electricity generated from renewable resources at a premium 
above market electricity rate. Before 2000, no states had implemented green power 
options, and eight states had mandatory utility green power options as of October 2010 
(DSIRE, 2010). The most common example of a green power option involves allowing 
customers to make voluntary contribution (Shrimali and Kniefel, 2011). Consumers 
contribute a premium for the amount of renewable power purchased.16 This type of green 
power option is called “voluntary renewable energy tariffs.” In the other case, utilities 
                                                          
16
 The premium is usually about $2 per 100kWh (Shrimali and Kniefel, 2011). 
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charge consumers a higher electricity rate to cover the additional cost for renewable 
power generation. Utilities typically provide green power owned by the utility or 
purchased under contract. This research classifies the required green power option as a 
type of information instrument. This is because it provides customers the knowledge that 
they can support renewable energy generation and thus allows consumers to voluntarily 
pay additional cost for this knowledge. Consumer purchase and demand for renewable 
electricity can contribute to renewable energy development. The premiums paid by 
consumers for green power can serve as a revenue stream to support investment in and 
operation of renewable energy facilities and technologies (Bird, et al., 2005). Shrimali 
and Kniefel (2011) show that states which require utilities to give their customers green 
power options are likely to increase renewable energy capacity.  
Generation Disclosure or Environmental Disclosure Policies 
Electric utilities are required to provide customers information on fuel mix 
percentages and related emissions. Generation disclosure allows customers to make 
informed choices on electricity and the provider they choose. Seven states had generation 
disclosure in 1998. As of May 2009, 22 states and D.C. have required some forms of 
generation disclosure (DSIRE, 2009).17  At the firm level, mandatory disclosure programs 
have statistically significant impact on the increase of the firms’ proportion of electricity 
generation attributable to renewable sources (Delmas, Monte-Sancho, and Shimshack, 
2010). 
 
                                                          
17
 Twenty one states have full disclosure requirements and three state and D.C. have partial disclosure 
requirements, and three states have proposed and pending requirements as of June, 2010 (U.S. DOE 2010).  
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2.3.4 Summary of Renewable Energy Policy Instruments 
Table1 offers a snapshot of classification result of currently adopted and 
implemented renewable energy policies at the state level. Based on the tri-fold 
classificatory scheme of policy instruments, this study classifies the 18 state legislative 
renewable energy policies and programs into three categories—command-and-control, 
market approach, and information policy instruments. In addition, under each group of 
policy instrument, renewable energy policies and programs are grouped or sub-
categorized by the virtue of each illustrative tool 18 for better understanding of the 
classification criteria and rationale.  
As of 2010, state governments used five types of command-and-control 
instruments are being used by state governments: renewable portfolio standards (RPS), 
green power purchasing programs, public benefit funds (PBF), contract licenses, and 
interconnection standards. Among these five policy instruments, RPS, PBF, and green 
power purchasing programs are identified as obligations because state governments 
mandate and enforce their setting policy goals on electric producers or governmental 
agencies through coercive and authoritative tools. Interconnection standards and 
contractor licenses are grouped separately as process standards. 
For the intervention in electric power markets, states have diversified market-
oriented policy instruments. State governments currently use eleven kinds of policies, 
programs or financial support that are designed to motivate electric producers to employ 
                                                          
18
 Salamon (2002) uses the term, “tool” or “instrument” interchangeably at the most descriptive level. He 
defines a tool of public action as “an identifiable method through which collective action is structured to 
address a public problem.” Salamon (2002) calls them “illustrative tools” and groups them together based 
on various criteria such as degree of coerciveness, directness, automaticity, visibility, etc.  
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more renewable energy technologies. This study places net-metering programs and 
access laws under the policy instrument of market approach and identifies them as 
economic regulations that lower market barriers and assure property rights for the new 
developers entering the market. One of the most popular tools adopted by states is 
providing financial incentives to the power suppliers. State governments offer various tax 
expenditures such as sales, property, personal, and corporate tax abatements for the 
purchase or installation of renewable energy equipment. States also award grants or loan 
electric power producers for their investment in renewable energy development. Using 
the market approach, governments can render the electricity market environment more 
favorable for energy developers. However, the actors ultimately have to take 
responsibility in taking advantage of given incentives when making their decisions.  
Increasing numbers of states have adopted a new type of policy instrument; 
information to alter the behavior of electric power suppliers. Some states require 
electricity suppliers to inform customers about the sources of energy or the amount of 
greenhouse gas emission. The other informative instrument that state governments 
encourage power companies to offer is green power options. Intellectual and moral 
appeals baseline these two informative instruments. 
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Table 1. Renewable Energy Policies in Three Types of Policy Instruments 
Policy Instruments Illustrative Tools19 Renewable Energy Policies and Programs 
Command 
-and- 
Control  
(5) 
Obligations 
Green Power Purchasing 
Renewable Portfolio Standard 
Public Benefit Fund 
License/process 
standard 
Contractor License 
Interconnection  
Market-based  
(11) 
Market Systems Net-Metering Access Laws 
Subsidies and grants 
Rebates 
Grants 
Loans 
Production Incentives  
Tax expenditures 
Personal Tax Credit 
Corporate Tax Credit 
Sales Tax Credit 
Property Tax Credit 
Industry Support 
Information 
(2) Information 
Required Green Power Option 
Disclosure 
Source: by Author 
  
                                                          
19
 Salamon (2002) uses the term, “tool” or “instrument” interchangeably at the most descriptive level. He 
defines a tool of public action as “an identifiable method through which collective action is structured to 
address a public problem.” Salamon (2002) calls them as “illustrative tools” and groups them together 
based on various criteria such as degree of coerciveness, directness, automaticity, visibility, etc.  
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CHAPTER III 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
This section reviews the empirical studies on renewable energy policies. The body 
of literature consists of (1) studies estimating the effects of states’ renewable energy 
policies and (2) studies on policy instrument adoption, which identify circumstances 
under which state governments adopt certain mixes of policy instruments. Recently there 
has been an increasing research using econometric methods to evaluate the effectiveness 
of states’ renewable energy policies. A majority of previous empirical studies focus on 
individual programs and policies, an effort to estimate the relationship between particular 
individual renewable energy policies and increase of renewable energy. However, this 
paper is more focused on the aggregate level of policy instruments that state governments 
adopt for promoting renewable energy. Though literature review, this section builds the 
research hypotheses with dependent and independent variables. This section reviews how 
previous studies quantify the variation in policy instruments adopted, identify and 
measure other variables.  
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3.1 Empirical Studies on Renewable Energy Policies 
Among various goals of renewable energy policies, this study focuses on the 
effectiveness of renewable energy policies pertaining to the goal of renewable energy 
promotion.  This section reviews a body of empirical studies that evaluate the 
effectiveness of renewable energy policy.  The body of literature includes previous 
studies that operationalized and measured the outcome of renewable energy policies. 
Also, in order to evaluate the marginal effect of different types of policy instruments, this 
section also reviews other determinants of renewable energy development discussed in 
previous studies.  
Menz and Vachon (2006) compared the impact of policy implementation for wind 
energy development across 37 states from 1998 to 2003 using multivariate techniques. 
They analyzed the impact of five renewable electricity policies classified under three 
policy regimes – financial incentives, mandatory rules, and regulatory changes – in 
regards to wind potential as a variable that affects wind power development. They 
constructed wind development indices measuring different dimensions of wind energy 
development for empirical analysis. They used the amount of installed wind capacity, the 
absolute growth in capacity between time periods of the study, and the number of large 
wind energy projects observed in each state. All wind electricity development indices 
showed similar results regarding wind electricity policies and wind potential in terms of 
their significance and directions. Their results demonstrated that renewable energy 
policies, taken all together, had a significant impact on wind energy development. RPS 
and mandatory green power offering programs, within the regulatory policy regime, had a 
statistically significant and positive relationship with wind power development. However, 
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the retail choice was significant and negatively associated with wind power development. 
The public benefit funds (PBF) and disclosure did not have significant impacts on 
renewable energy development separately. There is a possible explanation that PBF 
supports demand side rather than supply side of renewable energy (Menz and Vochon, 
2006). The contribution of Menz and Vochon’s study (2006) was found in its finding that 
particular state policies as well as a state’s natural endowment (wind potential) affect 
promotion of wind energy development, a finding supported by empirical assessment. A 
relatively small number of observations posed a limitation for their study. 
Carley (2009) examined the effectiveness of renewable portfolio standards (RPS) 
and tax incentives designed to promote renewable electricity production at the state level. 
Two separate dependent variables were used to measure state-level renewable energy 
development. Carley (2009) used the total amount of annual renewable electricity 
generation, excluding hydropower, measured in thousands of megawatt-hours.20 Her 
study also employed the renewable electricity (RE) share which was measured as 
percentage of electricity generated from renewable resources, excluding hydroelectricity, 
out of total state electricity generation. Different results were found depending on 
outcome measures in directions and significance of the association with RPS and other 
independent variables. RPS was positively related to total amount of electricity 
generation from renewable sources, but was not significantly associated with the share of 
renewable of total electricity. The variation in the size of renewable energy industry 
among states limited the statistical model measuring total renewable electricity. 
                                                          
20
 Electricity generation data is available from the EIA state electricity database. 
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Yin and Powers (2010) measured the stringency of RPS and analyzed its impacts 
on renewable energy development. They measured the development of renewable 
electricity as the percentage of electricity capacity from non-hydro renewable resources 
of total capacity in a state. To calculate the share of non-hydro renewable electricity 
capacity, the capacity of all electric utility plants whose primary energy source was non-
hydro renewables21 was counted.22 Yin and Powers (2010)’s definition of renewable 
energy development excluding hydropower was supported by historic background of the 
trend of renewable electricity industry. They also considered other factors such as other 
renewable energy policies, electric market characteristics, and political interest in the 
environment. Results showed that the existence of green power options in the power 
market and states’ experience of import of electricity have consistent and positive 
impacts on the investment in renewable energy technologies. 
Since the first commercial electricity-generating plant that used hydro power 
began its operation in 1882, the hydroelectricity’s potential has increased considerably in 
the U.S. Hydro power accounted for over 30% of total U.S. electricity generation in the 
1950s. The relative importance of hydropower, however, has decreased with increasing 
concerns about the environmental impacts of hydroelectric facilities and with 
advancement in alternative innovations in renewable energy technologies other than 
hydroelectricity. As of 2007, the share of hydro power of total electricity generation was 
about six percent (EIA, 2009)23.  
                                                          
21
 Non-hydro renewable technology includes wind, geothermal, solar, and biomass. 
22
 Utility level data on energy capacity by energy sources is obtained from EIA-906. 
23
 Derived from Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Review, 2008; Electric Power Annual, 
2009.  
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Instead, non-hydro renewable resources have been of interest to policy makers 
aiming to develop a variety of policies promoting the use of non-hydro renewable in 
electricity generation. As of 2010, total net generation of electricity from non-hydro 
renewables or other renewables is 167,173 thousand MWh, which accounts for 4.1% of 
total U.S. net generation (EIA, 2013 State Power Monthly). There are considerable 
variations among states, ranging from less than 1% to more than 24% (EIA, 2013 State 
Renewable Energy). The absolute amount of electricity generation from non-hydro 
renewable energy has been increasing since 1990—except for a one-year decrease of 
non-hydro renewable electricity generation between 2000 and 2001. The growth rate of 
electricity generation from non-hydro renewable has been considerably increasing 
considerably since 2001.  
This study employs two operational definitions of renewable energy development 
in states. Each is modeled as an effect of renewable energy policies. One is the amount of 
net generation of electricity from non-hydro renewable energy sources; the other is the 
relative use of renewables in electricity production, which means the share of non-hydro 
renewables in electricity generation in states.  
The share of non-hydro renewables is used because the relative use of non-hydro 
renewables in electric power production is not always proportional to the absolute 
amount of the electricity generated from renewable sources in the states. For instance, 
Maryland and Massachusetts experienced a decline in the total MWh of electricity 
production from renewable sources between 2006 and 2010, but the proportion of 
renewable sources used in electricity generation increased for the same period due to the 
overall decrease in electricity production in two states.  
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With two different variables, this study aims to provide compelling evidence of 
the effectiveness of public policy instruments as well as to examine the determinants of 
absolute and relative use of renewable energy technologies in electricity markets 
respectively. Energy Information Administration provides data on annual net generation 
of electricity by state by source.24  
3.2 Determinants of Renewable Energy Development 
In order to isolate the effects of policy instruments (or the marginal increase of the 
effects from policies) on states’ renewable energy development, alternative explanations 
have to be considered and factored in as control variables. This paper looks at the types 
of state governments’ policy instruments as an important determinant of variation in 
renewable electricity generation between states. The effectiveness of different policy 
instruments varies depending on the nature of not only the instrument, but also the 
circumstances (Salamon, 2002). This study therefore considers the different state 
characteristics which are assumed to influence electricity generation from renewable 
sources from the previous studies. As determinants of renewable energy generation, this 
study includes state’s policy instruments for renewable energy development, natural 
resources, state economy, political environment, and electricity market condition.  
3.2.1 Renewable Energy Policy Instruments 
Recently, numbers of empirical studies that evaluate the effectiveness of 
renewable energy policies have increased (Carley, 2009; Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 
2011; Menz and Vachon, 2006; Shrimali and Kniefel, 2011; Yin and Powers, 2010). 
                                                          
24
 Energy Information Administration. State Renewable Energy, 2007; State Electricity Profiles, 2009.         
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These studies, however, have tended to focus on the effect of particular renewable energy 
regulation such as renewable portfolio standards (Carley, 2009; Yin and Powers, 2010); 
measure individual renewable energy programs and examine the relationship between 
each program and renewable energy development (and Montes-Sancho, 2011; Menz and 
Vachon, 2006; Delmas Shrimali and Kniefel, 2011).25 A dichotomous variable is 
typically employed to measure an individual policy implementation in the majority of 
previous literature. Each renewable energy program such as renewable portfolio 
standards and mandatory green power option is measured as the value of “1” if a state has 
that policy in a given year (or prior to a certain year) and “0” if otherwise (Carley, 2009; 
Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011; Menz and Vachon, 2006; Shrimali and Kniefel, 2011).  
This binary variable that measures the presence of individual renewable policies 
however cannot capture the policy implementation of states at an aggregate level 
pertaining to policy instruments. This study aims to measure the trifold scheme of policy 
instruments comparable to each other in order to examine the variation of policy 
effectiveness between policy instruments and their synergetic (interaction) effects of 
policy mixes instead of individual programs. However, there is a lack of empirical studies 
that classify and measure the entire range of individual programs and incentives in a 
certain issue into types of policy instruments in the purpose of comparison of 
effectiveness between them. Persson (2006) states, “Identifying instruments may involve 
problems of aggregation, in that it may be unclear what constitutes a single instrument 
and what measures are sub-components of an instrument. Consistency in the 
identification exercise is the only way to overcome this problem.” In this respect, this 
                                                          
25
 Carley (2009) and Delmas and Montes-Sancho (2011) incorporate financial incentives in their analysis to 
control the effects of other renewable energy policies than their primary policy variables. 
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study is to develop aggregate indices to measure the magnitude and diversity of policy 
instruments. 
3.2.2 Other determinants 
Natural Resources 
Renewable energy resources are assumed to partially explain the variation in 
renewable energy production between states (Bird et al., 2005). The natural potential of 
renewable energy resources – solar, wind, and biomass, etc. – is geographically-oriented, 
idiographic, and not transportable between states. Renewable energy resources are one of 
the important factors for the success of renewable energy policy implementation. Even 
though not all renewable energy potential can be developed due to economic and physical 
limitations, technical potential of renewable energy allows estimating available 
renewable sources and costs of renewable resources (Deyette, Clemmer, and Donovan, 
2003).  
Renewable energy sources are spread out unevenly across the country. The Great 
Plains, from the east of the Rocky Mountains to the west of the Mississippi River in the 
U.S. have a vast potential of wind energy (Business Wire, 2004). The West and 
Southwest regions of the U.S. have high quality solar radiation, the greatest solar 
insolation in the U.S., so that solar power can be effectively generated in those regions 
(EIA, 1993). Electricity production using biomass is highly site-specific and regionally 
concentrated. This is because the location, quantities and prices of biomass resources 
determine the potential for biomass power and most of biomass resources are used in the 
easternmost or westernmost States (EIA, 1993). 
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For the electricity generation from wind sources, wind speed is critical because 
wind power density, the amount of energy in the wind, is proportional to the cube of wind 
speed (Center for Sustainable Systems, 2012). The effectiveness of solar power, 
conversion to electricity, varies depending on the intensity of solar radiation. Biomass 
power is generated from trees, agricultural good and feed crops and wastes, wood and 
animal wastes and residues, and municipal wastes and other waste materials. Through 
direct-combustion equipment, co-firing in coal fired boilers and fuel cell systems, 
biomass can be converted to energy and fuel. Therefore, renewable energy resources 
given to each region or state are expected to explain the adoption and the implementation 
of states’ renewable energy policies (Delmas and Montes, 2011; Haar and Theyel, 2006).  
The association between states’ renewable energy resources and renewable 
energy capacity or renewable energy generation has been analyzed (Carley, 2009; 
Delmas and Montes, 2011; Russo, 2003). However, there are inconsistent results found in 
previous empirical studies. Also, different types of renewable energy sources show 
different relationships to states’ renewable energy development.  States with higher solar 
and wind potential were likely to adopt a regulatory renewable energy policy – the 
renewable portfolio standards (RPS), higher potential of biomass was negatively related 
to RPS adoption (Delmas and Montes, 2011). Solar potential showed significant and 
positive impacts on renewable energy electricity generation, while wind and biomass 
potential were negatively related to renewable energy generation (Carley, 2009). In terms 
of wind energy potential, until 2006, states’ natural endowment did not show a linear 
association with RPS adoption rates and renewable energy generation (Carley, 2011).   
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Most of those previous studies used time-invariant measures of natural resources, 
which would be helpful to understand between-states differences in natural endowment 
and the impact on renewable energy policy adoption and/or renewable electricity 
generation. However, state-fixed and time-invariant measures have limitations that they 
cannot account for the degree to which the given potential of natural resources in a state 
contributes to electricity generation from renewable sources in the electric power industry. 
In order to look at the association of natural endowment and renewable energy 
deployment of states, this study uses time-variant measures of wind and solar potentials. 
The assumption is that a state can generate more renewable electricity when more natural 
resources are available.  
State Economic Characteristics 
States’ economic factors play significant roles in electricity production and supply. 
It is hypothesized that a wealthy state has the ability to invest more in environmentally 
friendly projects (Ringquist, 1994; Sapat, 2004). Some empirical analyses show that 
states with greater wealth, measured as per capita gross state product, show more 
renewable energy generation and a higher percentage of renewable energy generation 
(Carley, 2009). There are, however, different results about the relationship between state 
wealth and renewable energy capacity.  Various indicators are used to measure state 
wealth in previous studies such as per capita Gross State Product (GSP) (Shrimali and 
Kniefel, 2011), per capita income (Delmas and Monte-Sancho, 2010), or median 
household income (Yin and Power, 2010). In previous studies, however, electricity 
generating capacity from renewable sources did not have statistically significant 
association with above mentioned variables measuring state wealth (Delmas and Monte-
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Sancho, 2010; Shrimali and Kniefel, 2011; Yin and Power, 2010). It implies that the 
amount of electricity capacity does not seem to reflect the state’s economic 
characteristics. This is because nameplate capacity of renewable electricity is rated by 
manufacturers as the amount of capacity that generators26 produce under ideal conditions. 
Net generation of electricity, however, could vary depending upon various conditions. 
This study, therefore, expects that the more state wealth increases, the more electricity 
will be generated from renewable sources.   
States’ population growth is considered to affect the state demand for renewable 
electricity in either direction. A large population growth of a state can increase the 
renewable electricity generation in the respect that renewable resources may be an option 
for meeting rising demand. On the other hand, increasing demand for electricity because 
of a large population growth may increase electricity generation from fossil fuel due to its 
lower cost. Empirical studies (Carley, 2009), however, do not find a significant 
relationship between population growth and renewable energy development.  
Economic interest groups are involved in the policy process and implementation, 
and affect the ultimate outcomes of policy implementation. Manufacturing and mining 
industries are considered to be obstacles to pro-environmental legislation because 
environmental policies increase the cost of their industry or reduce the demand for their 
products (Sapat, 2004; Vachon and Menz, 2006). Regarding renewable energy promotion, 
producers in coal and natural gas industries and other industries related to fossil fuels can 
be interest groups lobbying pressure to states’ policy making and implementation process 
(Carley, 2009; Vachon and Menz, 2006). Hence, the presence of sizable stakeholder 
                                                          
26
 Which includes a generator, turbine, transformer, transmission circuit, station, or system (EIA Glossary). 
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groups which view renewable energy policies as negative propositions would detract the 
governmental support and regulations for renewable energy deployment and adversely 
influence the improvement of renewable electricity markets.  In practice, when Ohio 
passed its “Energy Bill” (S.B. 221), in 2008, the Ohio Manufacturing Association first 
opposed the legislation, then lobbied later to change the contents. Especially in regards to 
renewable energy policies, fossil fuel manufacturing industries are one of the biggest 
stakeholders who are influenced by policy adoption and implementation. Interest groups 
based on fossil fuel manufacturing and mining industries, therefore, are expected to be 
negatively associated with renewable energy deployment in a state (Carley, 2009; 
Shrimali and Kniefel, 2011). The strength of fossil fuel based interest groups have been 
measured by the percentage of gross state product pertaining to fossil fuel related 
industries (Carley, 2009). 
Political Environment 
The comparative public policy literature and policy choice theory enables 
consideration of states’ contextual factors driving variations in policy instruments choice 
(Berry and Berry, 1990; Daley and Garand, 2005; Feiock and West, 1993; Howlett, 2004). 
Policy instrument choice is not politically neutral and intervened by policy activities. A 
political environment not only affects instrument choice, but also the ultimate policy 
implementation (Peters, 2002). To evaluate policy instruments, therefore, political factors 
shaping policy instrument choice should be considered. Accordingly political 
environment has been measured by the preferences of state legislators and the nature of 
the constraints in the implementation process (Clark and Whitford, 2011; Daley and 
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Garand, 2005; Bressers 1998; Bressers and O’Toole, 1998; Schneider and Ingram, 
1990).27  
In consideration of these theories, recent empirical studies evaluating the 
effectiveness of renewable energy policies incorporate variables that represent states’ 
political environment related to adoption and implementation of renewable energy 
policies (Carley, 2009; Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011). States’ political environment 
has been operationalized with a variety of different variables. The presences of a 
democratic governor and majority democratic representatives have been shown to be 
positively associated with the adoption of renewable energy policies and investment in 
renewable energy infrastructure (Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011).   
State legislators’ preferences regarding environmental policy is measured by their 
voting history on environmental issues, as found in environmental scorecard of the 
League of Conservation Voters (LCV) 28 (Clark and Whitford, 2011; Carley, 2009; 
Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011; Shrimali and Kneifel, 2011; Vachon and Menz, 2006). 
This study assumes that renewable energy development is a subset of environmental 
issues, so that a state legislators’ preference toward renewable energy policies moves in 
the same direction where their commitment to overall environmental policy goes.  LCV 
score is the average House of Representative score of a state, which is an average of all 
congressional votes by state’s representatives on environmental issues. A high LCV score 
indicates that the state legislators tend to have greater preference for environmental 
                                                          
27
 Doern and Wilson (1974) argue that liberal democratic societies governments prefer to use the least 
coercive instruments (Persson, 2006). 
28
 Scorecards range from 0 to 100, which are available from the National Conference of the State 
Legislature, www.lcv.org. The LCV score is used in previous studies to measure the policy preference of 
state representatives (Baldwin and Magee, 2000; Kalt and Zupan, 1984; Nelson, 2002). 
51 
 
protection. Therefore, a state showing a high LCV rating is assumed to be more likely to 
demand electricity generated from renewable resources. Previous empirical studies show 
that LCV score has a positive relationship with the adoption of renewable portfolio 
standards (Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011) and share of renewable electricity (Carley, 
2009), but is not associated with total renewable electricity capacity or generation (Carley, 
2009; Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011). This study hypothesizes that states with 
governing bodies favorable toward environmental policies have higher rates of renewable 
energy development. 
In previous studies, social interest or citizen involvement in environmental groups 
were considered as a factor of renewable energy policy adoption (Delmas and Montes-
Sancho, 2011; Vachon and Menz, 2006). Environmental interest groups have increased 
(Straughan and Pollak, 2008) and stood against the political influence by industry based 
interest groups. The presence and strength of environmental interest groups are 
considered to support the pro-environmental legislation. For the adoption and 
implementation of state renewable energy policies, citizen participation in environmental 
groups is expected to be positively associated with state renewable energy deployment. 
The number of membership of environmental interest groups29 is used to measure the 
social interest in or citizen preference toward environmental issues (Delmas and Montes-
Sancho, 2011; Hall and Kerr, 1991; Sapat, 2004). Empirical studies have shown that 
states with more participants in environmental interest groups are more likely to adopt the 
renewable energy policies (Vachon and Menz, 2006), and also are likely to deploy more 
                                                          
29
 The number of Sierra Club membership is the most common for measuring state interest in 
environmental issues and strength of environmental interest groups (Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011; 
Hall and Kerr, 1991; Sapat, 2004). Some use a combined various environmental groups such as Sierra Club, 
Greenpeace, and National Wildlife Federation together (Vachon and Menz, 2006).  
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renewable energy technologies (Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011). This study, therefore, 
hypothesizes that the strength of environmental interest groups in a state is positively 
related to the renewable energy deployment in the state.  
Administrative institutions comprise another factor in policy adoption and 
implementation. Institutions directly and indirectly structure the frame in which policies 
are implemented. Therefore, once a policy is adopted, policy outcomes are affected 
depending upon the capacity of administrative institutions to monitor and enforcement 
the policy (Sapat, 2004). To capture the institution’s administrative capacity, proxy 
measures are used such as the number of staff members in state environmental agencies 
(Sapat, 2004) and the number of state and local employees in natural resource positions 
(Carley, 2009). Carley (2009) analyzed the impact of institutional capacity on 
deployment of renewable energy. Her results showed that the share of renewable 
electricity is positively associated with, but state net generation of renewable electricity is 
negatively associated with, the number of state and local natural resource staff members.  
This study expects that renewable energy generation of a state is positively related to the 
number of state and local governments’ employees working for the function of natural 
resources.  
Market Conditions of Electric Power Industry 
In the United States, the utility services of electricity generation, transmission and 
distribution have been traditionally operated by market systems. Hence, the electricity 
generation from renewable sources should be at least partially determined by the supply 
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and demand equilibrium under the given conditions and characteristics of electricity 
markets.   
One factor assumed to affect renewable electricity deployment is natural gas price 
and/or electricity price (Birds, et al., 2005; Carley, 2009; Shrimali and Kniefel, 2011).  It 
is arguable, however, whether or not natural gas and/or electricity prices determine 
increases in renewable electricity generation. Some have argued that high natural gas 
prices are positively associated with renewable electricity generation. This is because 
high wholesale prices of natural gas make renewable energy relatively competitive and 
cause electric producers to shift to use of relative cost competitive alternative energy 
(Bird, et al., 2005; Shrimali and Kniefel, 2011). For instance, the Western energy crisis is 
associated with the imbalances of supply and demand of electricity sources, especially 
natural gas (Bird, et al., 2005; Weare, 2003). California State thereafter has emphasized 
the importance of renewable energy and diversification and dependence of energy 
sources (Weare, 2003). There is another argument that the higher the price of electricity, 
the less likely consumers and/or electric utilities will want further investment in relatively 
expensive renewable sources for electricity generation. Instead, electric generators may 
switch the source of electricity generation from natural gas to cheaper fossil fuel (Carley, 
2009; EIA, 2009; Shrimali and Kniefel, 2011). Empirical studies show inconsistent 
results. Carley’s study (2009) showed a negative association between the share of 
renewable energy and retail price of electricity, but an insignificant relationship was 
found between electricity price and total renewable electricity generation. Shrimali and 
Kniefel (2011) included both natural gas price and electricity price in their model. They 
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found that electricity price is positively and natural gas is negatively related to states’ 
renewable electricity capacity.  
 As a possible factor affecting the electricity industry’s preference towards 
renewable sources, the pattern of net import/export of electricity between states is 
considered (Yi and Feiock, 2012; Yin and Powers, 2010). On one hand, states which 
heavily depend on importing electricity from other states may have incentives to search 
for diverse alternative energy sources available within states and reduce their energy 
dependence. On another hand, states that export electricity to outside states may generate 
electricity exceeding their needs using relatively cheap energy sources such as coal, 
natural gas, or nuclear power, and/or make profits through electricity transmission and 
distribution between states. Therefore those states may not benefit from adopting 
renewable energy technologies which cost a lot to start up and take longer time to gain 
returns. Yin and Powers (2010) included a variable measuring the ratio of electricity 
import/export in their model explaining the impact of states’ renewable portfolio 
standards on the percentage of renewable electricity generating capacity. Their results 
showed that states’ experience of increase in electricity import in the previous year 
positively affects the electricity markets to develop renewable energy in the following 
year. This study hypothesizes that the more a state imports electricity from other states, 
the more the state acts to develop renewable energy. In other words, a state that exports 
its electricity to other states is less likely to invest in developing renewable energy. 
The existence and magnitude of nuclear power production within a state also 
needs to be considered. Even though there is a continued controversy over whether 
nuclear power is a form of renewable energy or not, nuclear power worldwide is expected 
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to increase as concerns about greenhouse gas emission reduction and energy security 
(EIA, 2011).30 Displacing electricity from coal-fired generation, together with natural gas 
and renewables, nuclear power is expected to strongly advance (EIA, 2011).31  The use of 
nuclear power in a nation or a state can be interpreted either ways. A country or a state 
may operate nuclear power plants to substitute the source of electricity from coal to less 
polluting sources. In this case the existence or magnitude of nuclear power generation in 
a country or a state can be an indicator of its preference toward a diverse fuel mix or 
alternative energy sources, so does non-hydro renewables (Kneifel, 2009). However, a 
country or a nation’s nuclear power generation capacity may also be an impediment to 
deployment of renewable energy technologies. This is because when a county or a state is 
to displace its existing coal-fired generation to other sources, together with natural gas, 
nuclear power and renewables would be competing alternatives. In cases like this, 
existing capacity of nuclear power generation in a state could rather stand in the way of 
investment in renewable energy development. 
As of 2010, the United States produced 807 million megawatt hours of electricity 
from nuclear power plants. Thirty one states deployed nuclear power as their source of 
electricity generation and State of Illinois generated 96.2 million MWh, followed by 
Pennsylvania and New York states.32 Nuclear power accounted for approximately 20% of 
total electricity generation in the electric power industry in the U.S. over the last two 
decades.   
                                                          
30
 In the IEO2011 Reference case, electricity generated from nuclear power is projected to increase from 
2.6 million megawatthours in 2008 to 4.9 million megawatthours worldwide (EIA, 2011, p.4). 
31
 http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/ieo/pdf/0484(2011).pdf 
32
 Net Generation by State by Type of Producer by Energy Source (EIA-906, EIA-920, and EIA-923), 
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/state/ 
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 This study includes the ownership of electric utilities as one of the organizational 
strategies considered as an important variable influencing the success of implementation 
of renewable energy policies. There is a body of literature on the tools of governance 
(Doern and Phidd, 1983; Salamon, 2002) that considers governmental organizational 
strategies as instruments or tools of governance. Organizational strategies are represented 
as socialization and privatization of governing entities. Socialization is the type of 
governing strategy that a government establishes or owns an organization providing 
goods and services directly; the ownership or the operation of activities are transferred 
from the private to the public. Privatization occurs when government transforms the 
ownership or the operation of services from the public sector to private sector (Salamon, 
2002). Government organizational or administrative strategy however is considered apart 
from policy instruments in analytic policy instruments literature. This is because 
government organization is assumed as a prerequisite for policy instrument application 
rather than a kind of policy instrument (Vedung, 1998).  
 In most states, except Nebraska,33 investor-owned electric utilities consist of a 
large portion of the total electricity industry (EIA, 1999; EIA, 2012b).34 As private 
enterprises, investor-owned utilities provided about 62.6% of the total consumer base in 
the country in 2010 (EIA, 2012b, p.311). Delmas and Montes-Sancho (2011) incorporate 
the ownership of electric utilities for the first. They hypothesize that private utilities 
prioritize their consumers in order to maximize their profits. On the other hand, publicly-
owned utilities, which are governed by public entities such as locally elected or appointed 
                                                          
33
 Nebraska serves its entire electricity by publicly owned or consumer owned electric power utilities. 
Source: Nebraska Power Review Board (http://www.powerreview.nebraska.gov/) 
34
 EIA (1999), The Changing Structure of the Electric Power Industry 1999: Mergers and Other Corporate 
Combinations, http://www.eia.gov/cneaf/electricity/corp_str/chapter2.html; EIA (2012), State Electricity 
Profile, p.168, http://www.eia.gov/electricity/state/pdf/sep2010.pdf.  
57 
 
officials, are assumed to be more responsive to public policies (Delmas and Montes-
Sancho, 2011). The empirical result shows that RPS is more effective at privatized 
electric utilities in terms of investment in renewable capacity compared to publicly 
owned utilities (Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011). This can be understood that private 
utilities are more likely to be motivated by state renewable energy policies and utilize 
market incentives. In addition, many states exempt publicly owned utilities including 
municipal utilities and rural cooperatives from renewable energy standards and funds 
(Deyett, et al. 2003). This study hypothesizes that a state with more private electric 
utilities is more responsive to renewable energy policies.  
3.3 Summary of Literature Review 
 By reviewing previous studies on renewable energy policies and policy 
instruments, possible variables and their hypothetical directions toward dependent 
variable are found. The following table summarizes the explanatory and control variables 
and their expected relationship with states’ renewable electricity generation. This study 
uses actual net generation of electricity from renewable sources as the measure of 
dependent variable, renewable energy development. Hypothesized signs in Table 2 are 
derived from previous empirical studies and also indicate the expected results of this 
study.  
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Table 2. Hypothetical Relationship between Explanatory Variables and State Renewable 
Electricity Generation 
Variables Hypothesized Signs Previous Studies 
Command-and-Control  Type of 
Policy Instruments 
+ Menz and Vachon (2005); 
Carley (2009); Delmas and 
Montes-Sancho (2011); Shrimali 
and Kniefel (2011) 
Market-Based Approach  ? Carley (2009); Delmas and 
Montes-Sancho (2011); Shrimali 
and Kniefel (2011) 
Information Instruments + Delmas and Monte (2011); 
Shrimali and Kniefel (2011) 
Natural Resources  
? 
Menz and Vachon (2006); 
Carley (2009); Delmas and 
Montes-Sancho (2011) 
State Wealth + Carley (2009) 
Industrial Interest Groups 
- Manufacturing Industry 
- Fossil Fuel Manufacturing and 
Mining Industries 
 
- 
- 
Sapat (2004); Vachon and Menz 
(2006); Carley (2009); Shrimali 
and Kniefel (2011) 
Political Environment 
- Legislators’ Preference toward 
Environmental Issues 
- Democrat governor  
 
+ 
 
+ 
Carley (2009); Delmas and 
Montes-Sancho (2011) 
Social Interest in Environmental 
Issues 
+ Vachon and Menz (2006); 
Delmas and Montes-Sancho 
(2011) 
Institutional/Administrative Capacity + Sapat (2004); Carley (2009);  
Natural Gas Price + Bird et al. (2005) 
Electricity Price ? Carley (2009); Shrimali and 
Kniefel (2011) 
Privatized Governance of Electric 
Utilities 
+ Delmas and Montes-Sancho 
(2011) 
Export of Electricity - Yin and Powers (2010) 
Share of other power sources ? Shrimali and Kniefel (2011) 
Notes: (+) denotes positive influence, (-) denotes negative influence, and (?) denotes 
indeterminate influence.  
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CHAPTER IV 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHOD 
 
 
 This study is designed to explore and compare the effectiveness of state 
governments’ renewable energy policies classified according to a tri-fold scheme of 
policy instruments, including (1) command-and-control instrument, (2) market-based 
instrument, and (3) information instrument. This section presents the conceptual 
framework of analysis with which the directional relationship between renewable energy 
policies is identified in terms of the previously described factors and outcomes. Then, this 
section specifies the research hypotheses derived from literature review including 
theoretical arguments on the effectiveness of policy instruments and the prior empirical 
evaluations of renewable energy policies. Next, I discuss analytical models for time-
series cross sectional data analysis in terms of the purpose of this study. This section ends 
up with operational definitions and data sources of independent and dependent variables. 
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4.1 Conceptual Framework 
This study proposes a conceptual model with which to examine the isolated 
effectiveness of each renewable energy policy instrument: command-and-control, 
market-based, and information instruments. It is assumed that at least part of the variation 
in renewable energy development in states is attributable to the particular set of policy 
instruments adopted by state governments. This study considers several components of 
alternative explanatory variables expected to affect states’ renewable energy development 
based on the theoretical foundations of policy instruments and empirical results from 
prior renewable energy policy studies. This study models that renewable energy 
development in terms of actual electricity generation using non-hydro renewable sources. 
This study excludes conventional hydro power from its definition of renewable energy 
because recent state policies have aimed at supporting solar, wind, or biomass energy 
technologies while conventional hydroelectric facilities begun considering 
environmentally unfriendly. In addition, when including hydro power as renewables, the 
overall trend of renewable electricity generation in the U.S. shows little variation over the 
past decade because declining interest in conventional hydro power diminished the 
increasing trend of non-hydro renewable electricity production. The research models of 
the study represents the variation in total amount and/or share of electricity production 
from non-hydro renewable sources as a function of states’ intervention, specific forms of 
intervention include various policy instruments designed to encourage renewable energy 
production and other state specific characteristics such as natural resource, state 
economic factors, political environment, and the market conditions of electric power 
industries in states. The conceptual model is 
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RE_GEN = f (RE_POLICY, RESOURCE, ECONOMY, POLITICS, 
ELECTRIC_MARKET)                                                                                   (1) 
where RE_GEN represents the amount and share of electricity generated from non-hydro 
renewable resources within a state; 
RE_POLICY represents three policy instrument indices — command-and-control, 
market incentives, and information instruments that state governments adopt to 
promote renewable electricity generation; 
RESOURCE represents the natural endowment of renewable energy resources; 
ECONOMY represents the state’s economic forces to renewable energy industry; 
POLITICS represents the state’s political and social preference toward 
environmental issues and governments’ institutional capacity; 
ELECTRIC_MARKET represents the characteristics of the electric power market 
in a state. 
Figure 2 illustrates the postulated causal directions of the dependent and 
independent variables. The primary purpose of this study is to examine and compare the 
effectiveness of renewable energy policy instruments. It models a directional association 
of policy instruments and other factors with renewable energy development. The model 
enables to statistical isolation of the marginal effect of each policy instrument, holding all 
other factors constant.  At the same time, this study stipulates which other control 
variables are likely to impact renewable energy (RE) development. With the context of 
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this model, once can find the mechanism through which factors induce the electric power 
industry to produce renewable electricity under the given conditions of states. 
Figure 2. Conceptual Framework of Analysis 
 
4.2 Research Hypotheses on the Effectiveness of Policy Instruments 
This section introduces research hypotheses of this study.  Three primary research 
hypotheses are built upon aforementioned three types of states renewable energy policy 
instruments: command-and-control, market-based, and information instruments. Each 
hypothesis is derived from the theoretical discourse on the effectiveness of respective 
policy instruments. The empirical evidence of individual renewable energy policy 
instruments’ impact on renewable energy development, discussed in the literature review 
section, has also contributed to the construction of each hypothesis. 
RE DevelopmentState Economy
Policy Instruments
Natural Resources
Electric Power Market
Political Environment
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The primary purpose of this study is to discover what type of government 
activities, shown by states’ policy adoption and implementation, work effectively under 
the given circumstances of renewable energy markets and existing state economic and 
political environments. We observed that there has been a considerable increase in 
government intervention in the electric power market for renewable energy development, 
measured by number of policies and programs. Nevertheless, we have given little 
attention to neither how state governments got involved in the market, nor what types of 
government approaches work better than others under the current setting of renewable 
energy markets. Hence, this study is conducted to first examine the effectiveness of 
policy approaches that state governments have taken to foster renewable energy markets , 
then explore the conditions under which the electric power industry deploys renewables.  
To do so, this study grouped existing renewable energy policies based on the tri-
fold classificatory scheme of policy instruments. The three categories of policy 
instruments—command-and-control, market-based, and information instruments—enable 
us to at least partially understand if a state mainly appeals to forceful or coercive policy 
tools, if it offers financial incentives to the industry, or if the state persuades policy 
targets by educating and informing market suppliers and consumers. Retrospective 
examination of the effectiveness of additional adoption of each policy instrument can 
prospectively suggest the government’s future steps regarding better development of 
renewable energy production. Schneider and Ingram (1990) proposed several reasons 
why policies may fail to guide people to act to accomplish policy goals: without authority 
of law, incentives, and/or capacity, people do not comply with or utilize policies. 
Authority, incentives, and capacity each embodied the behavioral assumption of 
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command-and-control, market-based, and information policy instruments of this study, 
respectively. Therefore, the existence of positive effect of a certain policy 
approach/instrument is able to be interpreted that the current mechanism of the renewable 
energy market needs a governments’ policy guide based on the behavioral assumption 
under the pertaining policy instrument. 
Although it is argued that implementation of multiple policy instruments such as a 
“hybrid” of regulatory standard and financial incentives has been explored and justified 
(Bennear and Stavins, 2007), examining whether or not adoption of a single type of 
policy instrument is effective, all else being equal, is expected to give more meaningful 
guidelines. The first hypothesis deals with the relationship between the states’ adoption 
of command-and-control type policies and the increase of renewable electricity 
production. Command-and-control type policy instruments, mainly represented by rules, 
regulations, and standards, are considered to be effective with respect to the 
accomplishment of policy goals, in general (Campbell, et al., 2004; Harrington, et al., 
2004; Weimer and Vinning, 1999).  
We observed that state governments also have been increasingly applying 
command-and-control policy instruments such as RPS to the electric power market for 
renewable energy deployment. Without a specific policy goal or standard by the Federal 
government, the states’ use of coercion as a policy tool encourage the electric industry’s 
use of renewable electricity is expected to appropriately and effectively increase the 
production and share of renewable electricity.  Moreover, several previous empirical 
studies on the effectiveness of individual renewable energy policies showed statically 
positive associations between the number regulatory renewable energy policies like RPS 
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and various measures of renewable energy development (Carley, 2009; Delmas and 
Montes-Sancho, 2011; Menz and Vachon, 2005; Shrimali and Kniefel, 2011), while a 
few did not find a significant relationship between those two (Yin and Powers, 2010).  
This research perceives that the state governments’ intervention in the renewable 
energy market through the 2000s as an initial phase of public policy innovation and 
implementation. Hence, it is expected that an introduction of command-and-control 
policy instruments in the given electric markets will show a significant effectiveness in 
terms of the increase in the use of renewables for electricity generation. The first research 
hypothesis of this study is as follows. 
H1: A state that has more command-and-control type of policy instruments is 
more likely to deploy renewable sources for electricity generation.       
Next hypothesis is about the effectiveness of market-based policy instruments in 
the renewable electricity market. Since the 1980s, market-based policy tools like 
economic incentives have been regarded important and innovative because of their 
relative cost effectiveness pertaining to the flexibility given to policy target people in 
implementation process (Callan and Thomas, 2004; Hammar, 2006; Harrington et al., 
2004). At the same time, however, it is uncertain that market-based policies alone will be 
effective in altering people’s behavior to accomplish policy goals (Bernstein, 1993; 
Hammar, 2006). 
For the development of renewable electric industry, U.S. federal government has 
offered financial incentives, including feed-in-tariffs and tax expenditures, before state 
governments began intervening in the electric power industry. So, this study questions the 
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possibility that existing electricity industry’s use of renewable sources would 
significantly increase with additional introduction of economic incentives by state 
governments. In addition, the analytical results of previous studies support, to some 
degree, the suspicion this study carries regarding the lack of strong association between 
economic incentive tools and renewable energy capacity or production in those studies 
(Carley, 2009; Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011; Shrimali and Kniefel, 2011). Based on 
these conceptual discussion and empirical results, this study builds its second research 
hypothesis that holding all others variables constant, including pre-existing standards on 
renewable electricity generation, additional provision of economic incentives would not 
work effectively in the current electric power market. 
 H2: The number of market-based instruments adopted by states will not be 
associated with the increase of renewable electricity generation.                                                                     
The last research hypothesis pertains to the effectiveness of information 
instruments introduced by state governments. Information instruments, as defined in this 
study, are relatively new and emerging policy tools, encompassing direct information or 
knowledge provided by governments through policy tools to inform people about the 
existence and availability of other related policies (Vedung, 1998). It is argued that 
information as policy tools increases public awareness about essential policy issues and 
thus helps both market producers and consumers to be well informed (Stavins, 2003; 
Stephan, 2002; Weiss, 2002).  
For renewable energy development, some state governments have implemented 
several kinds of information instruments such as information disclosure and green power 
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option programs. Recent empirical studies included these renewable energy programs in 
the analysis and showed some positive effect of respective programs in the renewable 
electricity industry (Delmas and Monte, 2011; Shrimali and Kniefel, 2011).  This study 
argues a positive association between a state’s adoption of information instruments and 
the deployment of renewables in the existing electricity industry.  
H3: A state with more information instruments is more likely to generate  
renewable electricity.    
The following section presents the statistical models, independent and dependent 
variables, and operational definition of variables and data sources that help test the 
abovementioned three major research hypotheses.           
  
68 
 
4.3 Analytical Models 
 This study examines the effectiveness of renewable energy policy instruments 
using longitudinal data and cross-sectional time series data. Longitudinal data gives more 
information and variability, and more degrees of freedom which allows exploration of the 
more issues than time-series or cross-sectional data (Baltagi, 2001; Kennedy, 2008; Park, 
2011). As more longitudinal data have become available, more studies on state level 
regulation and financial incentives for renewable energy development have employed 
panel analyses (Carley, 2009; Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011; Shrimali and Kneifel, 
2011; Yin and Powers, 2010). However, choosing an appropriate panel data model is not 
only difficult, but also there is no one best modeling suitable to every dataset. This 
section, therefore, discusses several panel models in terms of their assumptions, for the 
purpose of helping to identify the appropriate model with which to estimate state-level 
renewable energy policy effectiveness. 
 First of all, if the model used to analyze the panel data utilized in this study does 
not produce heterogeneity or individual effects, ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation 
or pooled OLS regression is appropriate and provides consistent and efficient parameter 
estimates. However, OLS models applied to panel data usually violate this assumption 
(due to unobserved variables fixed in sectional units or time periods) (Baltagi, 2008; Born 
and Breitung, 2010). Moreover, even when OLS models are used with a dataset that 
meets this assumption, use of OLS estimation still should be done with great care. This is 
because pooled OLS regression assumes a constant slope and intercept regardless of state 
and year, and it relies on the implicit assumption that between-year and between-state 
comparisons are valid and of interest (Brüderl, 2005; Park, 2011). However, since the 
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purpose of this study is to estimate the effectiveness of governmental intervention using 
different types of policy instruments, under the various state-level conditions pertaining 
to renewable energy development, within-state estimates are the matter of interest.  
 When cross-sectional time series data have heterogeneity issues, panel data 
models should be considered. Here we compare random-effects and fixed-effects models 
in terms of their assumptions and strength and limitations. Random-effect models assume 
that individual specific characteristics (heterogeneity) are not associated with any 
independent variables; that is, the variation across state is random. Also, random-effect 
models assume a constant intercept and constant slopes across states (Brüderl, 2005; Park, 
2011; Wooldridge, 2012). Experimental research designs would in principle allow the 
investigator to appropriately estimate the effects of treatment using random-effects 
estimation. However, in practice, the independent variables are likely to be associated 
with state specific characteristics. Random-effects estimation is based on assumptions 
about between comparisons; therefore insofar as this study focuses on the impact of 
differences across states in terms of the dependent variable, random-effects estimation is 
useful. To meet the assumption of the random-effects model, a research model has to 
specify state-specific characteristics that may influence the independent variables (Green, 
2008; Torres-Reyna, 2012). In reality, however, there is usually omitted variable bias in 
the model due to unavailable variables (Baltagi, 2001; Park, 2011; Wooldrige, 2012).  
 Fixed-effects estimation, on the other hand, assumes state-specific characteristics 
may affect the predictor and/or outcome variables. In other words, it assumes there are 
time-invariant characteristics unique to the states. Hence, fixed-effects estimation allows 
assessing the net effect of regressors or independent variables by removing or demeaning 
70 
 
the effect of time-invariant, state-specific characteristics (Baltagi, 2001; Wooldridge, 
2012). Different from random-effects estimation, therefore, fixed-effects models do not 
affect biased due to omitted time-invariant and state-specific variables (Kohler and 
Kreuter, 2009). Rather, fixed-effects models explore the cause of changes within an 
entity. Any changes in the values of a dependent variable can be explained due to 
variation in predictors other than space-fixed characteristics (Stock and Watson, 2003; 
Wooldridge, 2012).  
 Based on the assumptions of pooled OLS, random-effects, and fixed-effects 
models, fixed-effects estimation is most suitable to the analysis of this study for many 
reasons. Because fixed-effects models allow an investigator to study the causes of 
changes in outcome variables within an entity, fixed-effects estimate is useful for policy 
analysis and program evaluation (Wooldridge, 2012). For analyzing the effectiveness of 
renewable energy policy instruments, therefore, this study will employ a fixed-effects 
model to answer the research question on whether the increase of renewable electricity 
generation is attributable to variation in policy instruments adopted within state, ceteris 
paribus.   
A fixed-effects model is advisable in respect to considerations about its 
assumption in terms of the existence of heterogeneity or individual specific effects as 
well. In practice, states have many entity-fixed variables related to the adoption of policy 
instruments and also to the energy production using renewable sources. For instance, the 
size of land area varies between states, and this is expected to in part determine the levels 
of investment and installation of renewable energy equipment. Also, under the guidelines 
set by state legislation, the deployment of renewable energy is left to electric power 
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industries as well as the policy designs of municipal authorities. There are a variety of 
player-initiated non-legislative initiatives in the energy market, such like green pricing 
and self-obligations. For instance, the state of Florida does not have a mandatory 
renewable portfolio standard enacted by governmental authority; but a municipal utility, 
JEA (formally Jacksonville Electric Authority), signed a memorandum with the Sierra 
Club and the American Lung Association of Florida giving testimony to its commitment 
of at least 7.5% of electric capacity from renewable energy sources by 2015.35 Also, there 
are a variety of rebate and loan programs offered by corporations, municipalities, or 
utilities to their members and consumers. 
Model 1 shows the statistical models of this study using fixed-effects estimate. 
This model allows us to explore the effectiveness of each type of policy instrument on 
states’ renewable energy deployment; also to compare the relative explanatory power 
between policy instruments.  
 =	 + 		 ∗ 	 + 	 ∗ 	 + 		 + 		 +                                  Model 1 
where “i” denotes a state, and “t” denotes a year of the observation;	 denotes intercepts; 
 denotes the total renewable electricity generation;  denotes the policy instruments 
indices (command-and-control, market-based, and information instruments) existing in a 
state (i) in a certain year (t);  denotes other control variables; 	 denotes the vector of 
state dummy variables; 	 denotes the vector of year dummy variables; and  denotes 
the error term. 
                                                          
35
 Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, Accessed July 26, 2013, 
http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?Incentive_Code=FL10R&re=1&ee=0. 
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 Later, the analysis results section introduces the statistical and technical processes 
for evaluating goodness-of-fit, comparing pooled OLS, random-effects, and fixed-effects 
models. Throughout the process, the study remains focused upon verifying and 
implementing the most appropriate analytical model for the panel data of this study.  
4.4 Variables and Data 
This study analyzes state-level observations as a unit of analysis. For the analysis, 
historical state level data, from 2001 to 2010, were collected. Analyses with time series 
cross sectional data or panel data were deemed most suitable for this study because panel 
data allows an investigator to study on time-ordering of events and individual dynamics 
of states with more informative data (Brüderl, 2005). Using pooled state-specific panel 
data, therefore, increases the power of the models and improves the validity of statistical 
conclusion of this study (Shadish, Cook, Campbell, 2002). This study looks at 48 states, 
excluding Alaska and Hawaii, and D.C. for the time span between 2001 and 2010. This 
following section presents dependent and independent variables with their operational 
definitions and data sources. 
4.4.1 Dependent Variables 
To measure the outcomes of renewable energy policies, this study employs non-
hydro renewable electricity generation, which is measured as the MWh of electricity 
generated from renewable resources excluding hydropower within a state. The Energy 
Information Administration (EIA) defines the non-hydro renewable resources as “other 
renewables,” which include “biogenic municipal solid waste, wood, black liquor, other 
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wood waste, landfill gas, sludge waste, agriculture byproducts, other biomass, geothermal, 
solar thermal, photovoltaic energy, and wind”. 36  
According to the hypotheses and analytic models, this study uses two separate 
dependent variables. The first dependent variable is total amount of annual renewable 
electricity excluding non-hydropower. The second dependent variable is share of 
renewable electricity to total electricity generation. This second variable is calculated by 
dividing a state’s annual amount of electricity generation from non-hydro renewable 
sources by total amount of electricity generated from all sources. Data for each state’s 
electricity generation are available, by energy source, between 2001 and 2010 in EIA’s 
report, State Electricity Profiles (EIA, 2012b).37 
4.4.2 Renewable Energy Policy Instruments 
This study reviews 18 state level policies and programs supporting renewable 
energy development across 48 states between 2001 and 2010. The major data sources of 
renewable energy policies discussed in this study are the Database of State Incentives for 
Renewable Energy (DSIRE), operated by the North Carolina Solar Center, the National 
Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), and the Energy Efficiency and Renewable 
Energy (EERE) at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). DSIRE provides regulations, 
policies and financial incentives related to renewable energy development.38  
The purpose of this study is to examine states’ renewable energy development 
derived attributable to policy instruments utilized by state governments. This study, 
                                                          
36
 State Electricity Profiles 2009. EIA (http://www.eia.gov/cneaf/electricity/st_profiles/sep2009.pdf) 
37
 http://205.254.135.7/electricity/state/ 
38
 The historical data between 2001 and 2007 on state regulations, programs and financial incentives for 
renewable energy were collected through personal contact of person in the North Carolina Solar Center. 
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therefore, classifies and measures current state level renewable energy policies to reveal 
between-state-variation in policy instruments through which states favor to implement for 
renewable energy development. State level policies and programs supporting renewable 
energy development were classified into three types of policy instruments based on the 
coerciveness and behavioral assumption that each policy or program involves. Three 
categories of policy instruments are command-and-control, market-oriented, and 
information policy instruments.  
This study creates indices of renewable energy policy instruments. First, this 
study constructs a dummy variable for each policy or program adoption, equal to one if a 
state has a renewable energy policy, and equal to zero if the state does not have a 
program in a given year (Carley, 2009; Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011). Each 
individual renewable energy program or policy is equally weighted and assigned into a 
group of policy instruments among three types. The command-and-control instrument 
includes five renewable energy programs and its index ranges from zero to five. Eleven 
renewable energy programs and incentives are assigned in the market approach 
instrument, ranging from zero to eleven. The information instrument contains two 
programs.39  
 
 
                                                          
39
 For measuring policy instruments, this study had adopted a relative frequency count calculated as the 
number of programs or incentives in each policy instrument adopted by each state divided by the maximum 
number of programs. A relative frequency count is used as a useful measure to compare the variations of 
policy adoption in different states (Meier, 1987; Ciocirlan, 2008). However, there was no difference 
between absolute numbers vs. relative frequency count measures in the level of significance explaining 
dependent variables. 
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4.4.3 Control Variables 
Natural resources 
 This study includes variables regarding the availability of each state’s 
renewable resources such as wind, solar, and biomass potentials. Wind and solar 
potentials are used as control variables affecting states’ renewable electricity generation. 
Previous studies (Carley, 2009; Delmas and Montes-Sancho 2011; Menz and Vachon, 
2006) employing technical potential of wind and/or solar energy of each state were 
estimated by the Union of Concerned Scientists (Deyette et al., 2003)  based on earlier 
work by Elliott, Wendell, and Gower (1991) and Doherty (1995).  These are, however, 
based upon time-invariant data and are therefore not applicable in terms of fixed effect 
panel analysis. Therefore, instead of using given data such as 10-year average, this paper 
uses real time data provided by National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). 
NASA’s POWER web site40 provides daily radiation and meteorological data from 1983 
through near-real time. For measuring each state’s solar and wind parameters, average 
annual daily measure is computed for each parameter applying average latitude and 
longitude41 of states. This paper uses Average Insolation Incident on A Horizontal 
Surface, measured as kWh/m2/day, to represent each state’s solar energy potential and 
employ Wind Speed at 10 m Above The Surface Of The Earth (m/s) for wind potential.42  
 In the final models, however, solar potential is not included due to the fact that it 
accounts for too small of a share of the total solar energy generated and thus may not be 
appropriate to use as a part of the explanation for the observed overall  changes in non-
                                                          
40
 The data are obtained from NASA's SSE and POWER, http://eosweb.larc.nasa.gov/sse/. 
41
 http://www.maxmind.com/app/state_latlon 
42
 http://power.larc.nasa.gov/cgi-bin/cgiwrap/solar/timeseries.cgi?email=daily@larc.nasa.gov 
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hydro renewable energy (EIA, 2012a, p.75). A state’s given solar potential, measured by 
annual average insolation incident on a horizontal surface (kWh/m2/day), varies little 
over time, even though there are significant differences between states. In addition, solar 
energy accounts for a very small proportion even among the electricity generated from 
non-hydro renewable sources. As of 2010, 1,212 thousand megawatt hour of electricity is 
generated from solar thermal and solar PV. It grew by 123% compared to the amount of 
electricity generated from solar energy in 2001, 543 thousand megawatt hour, but it 
accounts less than 1% of non-hydro renewable electricity (EIA, 2012b).43 
State economic characteristics 
 This study hypothesizes a positive association between state wealth and amount 
and proportion of a state’s electricity generation from renewable sources. This study 
measures state wealth by per capita gross state product (GSP). Per capita real GSP data, 
converted into constant 2005 dollar, are available at Bureau of Economic Analysis across 
48 for the time span of this study, from 2001 to 2010.  
The strength of fossil fuel based interest groups is expected to be negatively 
associated with a state’s renewable energy deployment. This is measured by the 
percentage of gross state product (GSP) attributable to the petroleum and coal product 
manufacturing and mining industries out of total GSP of the state respectively. U.S. 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) provides the gross domestic product by state by 
industry available for the time period of this study.  
 
                                                          
43
 http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data.cfm#generation 
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Political environment 
 This study hypothesizes that state legislators’ preference toward environmental 
issues positively affect the renewable energy deployment of the state. In line with 
previous studies (Carley, 2009; Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011; Shrimali and Kneifel, 
2011), this study will use the scorecards offered by League of Conservation Voters 
(LCV). Among various scores, the average score of states’ House of Representatives on 
environmental issues of each state will be used to measure the preference of a state’s 
governing body vis-a-vis renewable energy deployment. LCV scores are available on an 
annual basis in the National Environmental Scorecard, provided by League of 
Conservation Voters44. 
The political affiliation of governors is also considered to be a factor in renewable 
energy production. This study measures the presence of Democratic governors with 
dummy variables as 1 if the political affiliation of governor in a state in a given year is a 
democrat; as 0 if governor is Republican or Independent. The National Governors 
Association provides the political affiliation of the governors of the 50 states. 
Another political environment variable that this study considers is the capacity of 
administrative institution. To measure states’ administrative capacity affecting renewable 
energy implementation, this study uses the number of employees working for natural 
resources in state and local governments (Carley, 2009). Historical statistics on 
government employment are available from the Annual Survey of Public Employment 
and Payroll45 at the Bureau of Census. Government employment data are provided by 
                                                          
44
 http://scorecard.lcv.org/scorecard/archive 
45
 http://www.census.gov/govs/apes/historical_data.html 
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states, by government function. This study looks at the number of state and local 
governments’ employees assigned to the government function of natural resources. This 
study counts full-time equivalent (FTE) employees of state and local governments 
according to each state. A state’s administrative capacity for natural resources is 
measured as number of FTE public employees for natural resources per million people.46  
 This study includes social interest in environmental issues among the factors used 
to explain the renewable energy deployment of states. This study hypothesizes that a state 
with a higher level of citizen participation in environmental groups is likely to be more 
supportive of the state legislation and policy implementation for renewable energy 
development. This study measures Sierra Club chapter membership per 1,000 people in 
each state as the degree of social interest in environmental issues. The historical statistics 
of Sierra Club membership by chapter was obtained through Sierra Club Member 
Services.47    
Electricity market conditions 
This study expects that higher fossil fuel prices, natural gas in particular, will 
stimulate more electric suppliers to shift to renewable energy sources. For the analysis 
this study considers only the natural gas consumed for electricity generation. In the State 
Electricity Profile, EIA provides information on the fuel prices at which each state’s 
electric power sector purchases its resources by fuel type such as natural gas, coal, and 
                                                          
46
 2006 Mississippi has missing value in state and local governments’ FTE employment for natural resource. 
Estimate is calculated as the average of 2005 and 2007 employees. LA 2006 state and local governments’ 
FTE employment for natural resource is missing.  
 
47
 Sierra Club website, http://www.sierraclub.org/contact/ 
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petroleum. 48 This study uses the natural gas prices measured as cents per million Btu 
(British thermal unit). 
Another market factor which is expected to explain the variation in renewable 
energy deployment is electricity price. However, it is hard to predict the direction toward 
which electricity price affect states’ investment in renewable energy technologies. 
Previous studies did not show a consistent result for the relationship between electricity 
price and renewable electricity generation and/or capacity (Carley, 2009; Shrimali and 
Kniefel, 2011). This study will use the states’ average annual retail electricity price, 
measured in cents per kilowatt-hour. EIA provides the historical electricity price data by 
state, between 1990 and 2010.49  
This study assumes that a state’s experience of electricity import incentivizes the 
state to develop renewable energy. Yi and Feiock (2012) used the net import of electricity 
from other states, in million Btu, in their study of the determinants of states’ renewable 
portfolio standards adoption. Measures of variation in states’ electricity import/export 
tendencies, however, should consider the relative size of the energy industries within the 
respective states. Yi and Powers’ study (2010) measured states’ import ratio of electricity 
by computing the net difference between electricity sales and generation divided by total 
electricity sales within a state. They modeled a year lagged impact of states’ experience 
in increase or decrease of electricity import ratio on renewable energy development.50 
However, their measure is not only complicated to interpret, but also generates negative 
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 Missing data for some states were estimated by the average natural gas prices of neighboring states 
according to NERC. 
49
 EIA (2011). Electric Power Annual. http://205.254.135.7/electricity/data.cfm#sales 
50
 IMPORTRAIOit = (SALESi,t-1 – GENERATIONi, t-1) / (SALESi, t-1) 
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values which do not allow possible data transformation, e.g. log transformation, for 
appropriate and efficient statistical analysis.  
The EIA provides states’ net interstate trade of electricity51 and net trade index of 
electricity in its annual report of State Electricity Profiles.52 The net trade index is the 
ratio of a state’s total supply, including electricity generation and import from other 
countries, to state total use of electricity, sum of in-state consumption and international 
exports. 53 EIA’s net trade index is useful in terms of looking at the overall size and 
trends of states’ import and export of electricity. However, EIA’s net trade index would 
be a misleading measure of states’ self-sufficiency ratio for electricity, because it 
considers import from other countries as a part of states’ electricity supply.  
Based on the aforementioned two indices, this study measures a state’s electricity 
import/export ratio by the net generation of electricity in a state over total electricity sales 
within the state. The underlying assumption is that a state exports whatever portion of its 
electricity production exceeds total demand in the state.  An electricity export index 
bigger than unify indicates a positive net export of electricity of a state; export index 
smaller than 1 refers positive net import of electricity from other states. Data for the 
MWh of net generation and sales of electricity by state are provided by the Energy 
Information Administration.  
The type of governance of electric utility industry is measured by the ownership 
of electric utilities. The ownership of utilities is expected to influence the utilization of 
                                                          
51
 Net Interstate Trade = Total Supply - (Total Electric Industry Retail Sales + Direct Use + Total 
International Exports (if applies) + Estimated Losses). 
52
 EIA, http://www.eia.gov/electricity/state/. 
53
 Net Trade Index is the sum of Total Supply / (Total Disposition - Net Interstate Trade). 
81 
 
state governments’ financial incentives, subsidies, and tax expenditures. Energy 
Information Administration issues Electric Sales, Revenue, and Average Price data by 
state and utility.54 This includes class of ownership – public, cooperative, and investor-
owned – state location, number of consumers, revenue, sales (MWh), etc. Data are 
available from 1994 to 2010. This study measures the share of private utility by the 
percent of the sales sold by investor-owned utilities to total electric utility sales in each 
state. 
The final control variables are year dummies. To control the heterogeneity 
attached to years, year dummies with 2001 reference are measured. There are some 
variables which must have influenced the renewable energy industry, but which are hard 
to allocate to states, such as federal efforts for renewable energy development under 
ARRA 2009 or the recent downturn and recovery in the US economy. This study is 
especially interested in the year effects of 2009 and 2010 when the Federal government 
awarded cash grants to renewable electricity developers under ARRA. Significant year 
effects in 2009 and 2010, in particular, could give us some evidence of the effectiveness 
of Federal effort to develop renewable industries through the stimulus package.  
Table 3 presents the operational definitions and data sources of all dependent and 
independent variables used in the final models.  
  
                                                          
54
 EIA, http://www.eia.gov/electricity/sales_revenue_price/index.cfm 
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Table 3. Variable definitions and data sources 
Variable Definition Data Source 
Total renewable 
electricity 
Total amount of electricity in MWh generated from non-hydro 
renewable (other renewables) 
U.S. Energy 
Information 
Administration (EIA) 
Share of 
renewable 
electricity 
Percentage of renewable electricity out of total net electricity generation EIA 
Command-and-
control policy 
index 
Number of existing renewable energy policy instruments classified as 
command-and-control type instrument in a state each year, range 0-5 
Database of State 
Incentives for 
Renewables & 
Efficiency (DSIRE) 
and by author 
Market-based 
approach index 
Number of existing renewable energy policy instruments classified as 
market approach in a state each year, range 0-11 
DSIRE and by author 
Information 
instrument index 
Number of existing renewable energy policy instruments classified as 
information instrument in a state each year, range 0-2 
DSIRE and by author 
Wind potential Annual average daily measure of wind speed at 10 m  above the surface 
of the earth in m/s for average latitude and longitude of each state 
NASA 
Per capita GSP Annual gross state product per capita, inflation adjusted to 2010 dollar 
value 
U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis 
(BEA) 
Share of fossil 
fuel 
manufacturing  
Percentage of the product in the petroleum and coal manufacturing 
industry out of total GSP 
BEA 
Share of mining 
industry  
Percentage of the product in the mining industry out of total GSP BEA 
Sierra 
membership 
Number of the Sierra Club chapter membership per 1,000 state 
population  
Sierra Club HQ 
Democrat 
Governor 
If governor’s political affiliation is democrat, 1; republican or 
independent, 0. 
National Governors 
Association 
House score Average voting scores on environmental issues of House of 
representatives, range 0-100 
League of 
Conservation Voters 
State and local 
NR employment 
 
Number of full-time equivalent employees working for natural resources 
in state and local governments per million people within a state 
Census 
Total electricity 
sales 
Total amount of residential, commercial, and industrial electricity sales 
within each state, MWh  
EIA 
Natural gas price Annual average natural gas price purchased by electric power industry 
in cents per million Btu, inflation adjusted to 2010 dollar value 
EIA 
Electricity price States’ average annual retail electricity price EIA 
Share of nuclear Percentage of nuclear power generation out of total electricity 
generation 
EIA 
Share of hydro Percentage of hydro conventional electricity generation over total 
amount of electricity generation 
EIA 
Share of IOU Percentage of electricity sales of investor-owned-utilities over total 
electricity sales  
EIA 
Electricity export 
ratio 
The amount of electricity generation divided by total sales in Mwh 
within states. 
EIA 
Note: Data are retrieved for 48 states and the time period of years between 2001 and 2010. 
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CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
 
 
 This section presents the results of statistical analyses which test the hypotheses 
discussed in the previous section. This study is mainly to examine and compare the 
effectiveness of three different types of policy instrument on states’ renewable energy 
development, all other things being equal. This study measures renewable energy 
development within each state and observes state level renewable energy policy 
instruments and all other independent variables across 48 states, excluding Alaska, 
Hawaii, and D.C., over the time period between 2001 and 2010. This section first covers 
the trends in renewable energy development and variation in states’ policy design for 
developing renewable energy in the United States, focusing on 48 states over the past 
decade. A descriptive analysis of all other independent variables is following. Then, this 
section presents results from statistical models which tests the hypotheses of this study. 
The conclusion highlights how the effectiveness of renewable energy policies varies 
depending on the types of policy instruments and what other variables explain the states 
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renewable energy development. It also compares the estimations from different model 
specifications.  
5.1 Trends in Renewable Electricity Generation 
In order to examine the relationships between renewable energy policies and their 
effects, it is important to observe variation in states’ policy designs and renewable 
electricity generation among states over years. Overall trends in the electricity industry of 
the 48 states, in terms of electricity generation by sources, are shown in Table 4. In 2010, 
48 states generated a total of 4,107 TWh electricity, which grew by 10.4% compared to 
the total electricity generation in 2001. Of a 388 TWh growth in electricity generation, 84% 
increased between 2001 and 2006. The economic recession that the United States 
experienced in 2008 and 2009 can account for a weakening in the growth in the overall 
electricity market.  
Meanwhile however, for electricity generation, the 48 states increased their use of 
non-hydro renewable technologies by 139% between 2001 and 2010. From 2006 to 2010, 
the energy industry generated 70 TWh of electricity from non-hydro renewable sources, 
accounting for 73% of total change since 2001. The electricity industry had a rapid 
increase in the share of non-hydro renewable sources in electricity generation. In 2001, 
non-hydro renewable technologies were used for 1.9% of total electricity generation, but 
in 2010 electricity suppliers generated 4% of electricity from non-hydro renewable 
sources (see Table 5). 
Table 4 shows the averages of 48 states’ total electricity, non-hydro renewable 
electricity generation, and percentages of non-hydro renewable electricity, and the results 
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of analysis of variance (ANOVA) that compare changes of those three measures over 
years. Since 2001, 48 states’ average total electricity increased from 77.5 TWh to 85.6 
TWh, but there was no statistically significant increase (F=.17, p=.84) between years 
considering the variance among states. During the same period, however, electricity 
generation using non-hydro renewable technologies increased statistically significantly 
(F=3.09, p=.048) at 95% confidence level. Average non-hydro renewable electricity of 
the 48 states increased from 1,463 GWh in 2001 to 3,466 GWh in 2010. Therefore, the 
percentage of non-hydro renewable electricity also significantly changed over years 
(F=5.88, p<.00). 
Table 4. Electricity Generation by Year (MWh, %) 
 Year N Mean S.D. Minimum Maximum F p 
Total 
Electricity 
2001 48 77,482,157 67,779,197 5,480,614 372,580,002 .17 .84 
2006 48 84,299,737 73,991,627 5,967,725 400,582,878 
2010 48 85,568,009 74,894,552 5,627,645 411,695,046 
Non-hydro 
Renewable 
Electricity 
2001 48 1,463,368 3,164,466 0 21,600,000 3.09 .048 
2006 48 1,997,604 3,548,012 417 23,900,000 
2010 48 3,465,679 5,248,432 138,197 27,700,000 
Percent 
Non-hydro 
Renewable 
2001 48 2.19 3.36 0.00 19.55 5.88 .00 
2006 48 2.81 3.65 0.01 23.59 
2010 48 4.85 4.78 0.29 24.40 
 
There appear differences in the size of electricity supply and energy sources 
between states. Table 5 shows total electricity generation, non-hydro renewable 
electricity, and percentage of non-hydro renewable electricity by states over the years of 
2001-2010. In 2010, Texas was ranked first in total electricity generation with 411.7 
TWh, accounting for 10% of total electricity generated in the 48states. Pennsylvania, 
Florida, California, and Illinois have large electrical generating industries that produced 
more than 200 TWh of electriciy in 2010. Of these states, Texas and California were 
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ranked first and second in use of non-hydro renewable technologies for electricity 
generation. Each state generated more than 25 TWh electricity from renewable sources, 
and their total accounted for 32% of U.S. total renewable electricity generation in 2010. 
When looking at the percentage of electricity generated from non-hydro renewable 
sources, Maine was ranked first with 24.4%; and Iowa (16.3%), South Dakota (13.7%), 
California (12.5%), Minnesota (12.4), and North Dakota (11.8) are following in 2010 
(see Table 5).  
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Table 5. Electricity Generation by State (MWh, %) 
Area 
Total Electricity Non-Hydro Renewables Percent Renewables 
2001 2006 2010 2001 2006 2010 2001 2006 2010 
Alabama 125,345,113 140,895,441 152,150,512 4,189,364 3,884,462 2,376,986 3.34 2.76 1.56 
Arizona 89,911,272 104,392,528 111,750,957 39,437 53,567 318,907 .04 .05 .29 
Arkansas 47,192,035 52,168,703 61,000,185 1,511,997 1,722,805 1,623,943 3.20 3.30 2.66 
California 198,596,075 216,798,688 204,125,596 21,600,000 23,900,000 25,400,000 10.89 11.03 12.47 
Colorado 46,876,002 50,698,353 50,720,792 112,843 896,228 3,554,533 .24 1.77 7.01 
Connecticut 30,490,646 34,681,736 33,349,623 908,924 763,320 739,660 2.98 2.20 2.22 
Delaware 6,807,684 7,182,179 5,627,645 0 417 138,197 .00 .01 2.46 
Florida 190,945,344 223,751,621 229,095,935 3,789,757 4,330,690 4,486,723 1.99 1.94 1.96 
Georgia 118,316,789 138,010,208 137,576,941 3,002,754 3,418,918 3,180,563 2.54 2.48 2.31 
Idaho 9,346,941 13,386,085 12,024,564 533,335 689,957 1,014,010 5.71 5.15 8.43 
Illinois 179,249,285 192,426,958 201,351,872 678,569 848,832 5,138,159 .38 .44 2.55 
Indiana 122,569,673 130,489,788 125,180,739 114,580 220,212 3,245,666 .09 .17 2.59 
Iowa 40,658,512 45,483,462 57,508,721 591,612 2,454,717 9,360,483 1.46 5.40 16.28 
Kansas 44,748,523 45,523,736 47,923,762 39,832 991,890 3,459,351 .09 2.18 7.22 
Kentucky 95,417,626 98,792,014 98,217,658 9,553 458,798 439,875 .01 .46 .45 
Louisiana 87,894,377 90,921,829 102,884,940 2,704,289 2,962,363 2,467,776 3.08 3.26 2.40 
Maine 19,564,821 16,816,173 17,018,660 3,825,725 3,967,651 4,152,283 19.55 23.59 24.40 
Maryland 49,062,340 48,956,880 43,607,264 373,015 626,161 573,665 .76 1.28 1.32 
Massachusetts 38,478,434 45,597,775 42,804,824 1,312,787 1,278,829 1,273,734 3.41 2.81 2.98 
Michigan 111,845,610 112,556,739 111,551,371 2,361,663 2,442,559 2,832,452 2.11 2.17 2.54 
Minnesota 48,523,226 53,237,789 53,670,227 1,977,113 3,058,884 6,639,633 4.08 5.75 12.37 
Mississippi 53,446,452 46,228,847 54,487,260 1,432,117 1,541,082 1,504,270 2.68 3.33 2.76 
Missouri 79,544,873 91,686,343 92,312,989 8,798 23,971 987,597 .01 .03 1.07 
Montana 24,232,485 28,243,536 29,791,181 65,425 530,385 1,027,157 .27 1.88 3.45 
Nebraska 30,485,212 31,669,969 36,630,006 19,293 313,261 493,153 .06 .99 1.35 
Nevada 33,875,966 31,860,022 35,146,248 1,199,873 1,343,711 2,286,647 3.54 4.22 6.51 
New Hampshire 15,074,624 22,063,695 22,195,912 1,025,621 746,380 1,232,218 6.80 3.38 5.55 
New Jersey 59,421,260 60,700,139 65,682,494 843,632 916,783 850,054 1.42 1.51 1.29 
New Mexico 33,611,643 37,265,625 36,251,542 18,652 1,277,321 1,854,792 .06 3.43 5.12 
New York 143,914,559 142,265,432 136,961,654 1,801,072 2,596,641 4,814,548 1.25 1.83 3.52 
North Carolina 117,495,850 125,214,784 128,678,483 1,751,290 1,828,305 2,083,142 1.49 1.46 1.62 
North Dakota 30,332,072 30,881,137 34,739,542 7,665 373,029 4,108,028 .03 1.21 11.83 
Ohio 142,261,807 155,434,075 143,598,337 430,961 458,615 700,089 .30 .30 .49 
Oklahoma 55,249,450 70,614,880 72,250,733 230,696 2,009,724 4,159,956 .42 2.85 5.76 
Oregon 45,051,906 53,340,695 55,126,999 839,528 1,828,988 4,756,880 1.86 3.43 8.63 
Pennsylvania 196,576,591 218,811,595 229,752,306 1,896,196 2,472,946 4,245,175 .97 1.13 1.85 
Rhode Island 7,501,892 5,967,725 7,738,719 103,616 148,913 140,073 1.38 2.50 1.81 
South Carolina 89,158,987 99,267,606 104,153,133 894,154 1,910,437 1,873,064 1.00 1.93 1.80 
South Dakota 7,400,743 7,132,243 10,049,636 871 148,965 1,371,750 .01 2.09 13.65 
Tennessee 96,221,976 93,911,102 82,348,625 822,025 810,599 987,550 .85 .86 1.20 
Texas 372,580,002 400,582,878 411,695,046 2,180,945 7,818,260 27,700,000 .59 1.95 6.73 
Utah 35,853,750 41,263,324 42,249,355 158,238 205,476 780,967 .44 .50 1.85 
Vermont 5,480,614 7,084,344 6,619,990 382,541 449,910 482,339 6.98 6.35 7.29 
Virginia 74,104,750 73,069,537 72,966,456 1,747,072 2,458,450 2,219,649 2.36 3.37 3.04 
Washington 83,048,669 108,203,155 103,472,729 1,221,331 2,502,854 6,616,963 1.47 2.31 6.40 
West Virginia 81,836,725 93,815,804 80,788,947 15,527 174,053 939,172 .02 .19 1.16 
Wisconsin 58,763,431 61,639,843 64,314,067 1,102,210 1,265,623 2,473,956 1.88 2.05 3.85 
Wyoming 44,776,938 45,400,370 48,119,254 365,159 759,061 3,246,793 .82 1.67 6.75 
Total 3,719,143,555 4,046,387,390 4,107,264,431 70,241,657 95,885,003 166,352,581 1.89% 2.37% 4.05% 
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5.2 Innovative Policy Designs for Renewable Energy Development  
Between 2001 and 2010, the 48 states developed new renewable energy policy 
designs. Overall, states have implemented an increasing number of programs and policies 
and also diversified their approaches to electricity markets so as to increase the use of 
renewable energy technologies. Table 6 shows the average number of renewable energy 
policies utilized by 48 states, reflecting the years 2001, 2006 and 2010. As mentioned 
before, 18 state level policies and programs supporting renewable energy development 
were equally weighted and classified into three types of policy instruments. The 
command-and-control instrument index ranges from zero to five; the market-based 
instrument ranges from zero to eleven; and the information instrument ranges zero to two. 
The sum of the three policy instruments is presented as “Total” in the table. 
Overall, state governments have significantly increased their intervention in 
renewable energy industries. Mean values of Table 6 show the average number of total 
renewable energy policy instruments that each 48 states adopted in each year. It is 
evident that state governments have introduced more policy instruments to the renewable 
energy market (F=17.58, p<.00) (Table 6). The number of policy instruments adopted by 
48 state governments was almost doubled between 2001 and 2010.  The 48 state 
governments had adopted only one command-and-control type policy instrument, on 
average, for motivating renewable energy producers in 2001, but in 2010 states utilized 
on average two kinds of command-and-control instruments. A huge increase is seen in 
market-based instruments used by state governments. State governments offered, on 
average, six types of market-based incentives for the power producers to deploy more 
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renewable energy technologies in 2010. Information instruments were also introduced 
and increased to use at state level. 
Table 6. Number of Policies for Renewable Energy Development by Year 
Policy 
Instruments Year N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error F p 
Command-
and-control 
(0-5) 
2001 48 1.1 1.057 0.153 
7.305 0.001 2006 48 1.6 1.267 0.183 
2010 48 2.04 1.271 0.183 
Market-Based  
(0-11) 
2001 48 3.17 1.993 0.288 
20.017 0.000 2006 48 4.29 2.343 0.338 
2010 48 5.98 2.226 0.321 
Information  
(0-2) 
2001 48 0.33 0.476 0.069 
3.764 0.026 2006 48 0.63 0.64 0.092 
2010 48 0.65 0.729 0.105 
Total 
(0-18) 
2001 48 4.6 2.819 0.407 
17.58 0.000 2006 48 6.52 3.632 0.524 
2010 48 8.67 3.563 0.514 
 
There are variations between states and years in regards to the existence of 
renewable energy policy instruments. In 2001, 48 states adopted 4.6 renewable energy 
policies or programs out of 18 programs on average. New York adopted the greatest 
number of renewable energy policies in 2001: three regulations, seven market incentives, 
but no information instruments. California, Connecticut, Minnesota, and Oregon had nine 
policy instruments and Arizona, Massachusetts, Montana, and Rhode Island had adopted 
eight programs to encourage renewable energy development. On the other hand, however, 
until 2001, 18 states had not adopted any kind of regulatory instrument and only 10 states 
introduced an informative/voluntary policy instrument to their energy industry. Three 
states, Louisiana, South Carolina, and West Virginia, did not have legislative activities to 
force or incentivize their electricity industry to deploy renewables, in respect to the 18 
policies or programs in which this is interested. Interestingly, 13 states such as Indiana, 
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North Carolina, and Tennessee supported the use of renewable energy technologies 
through market instruments, but did not introduce any regulatory nor informative policy 
instruments (see Table 7). 
As of 2010, there were, on average, 8.6 legislated policies or programs for 
renewable energy development per state in the 48 states. Massachusetts and Oregon had 
implemented 16 renewable energy programs and incentives. Massachusetts had 
introduced all 11 types of market instruments, including market regulations and financial 
incentives. New York and New Jersey had 15 and 13 renewable energy policies/programs 
respectively. Also eleven states55 had more than 11 policies supporting renewable energy 
development. As of 2010, every state had adopted at least one policy instrument 
supporting renewable energy technologies. Six states—Idaho, North Dakota, Tennessee, 
Oklahoma, Alabama, and Mississippi—had not yet adopted regulatory or informative 
policy instruments, but had introduced market instruments. Half the 48 states had 
introduced at least one information instrument into their electricity industry to encourage 
energy suppliers to voluntarily employ renewable energy technologies (Table 7).  
                                                          
55
 Connecticut, Maine, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, Ohio, Vermont, Wisconsin (12), California, Montana, 
Rhode Island (11) in 2010. 
91 
 
Table 7. Number of Renewable Energy Policy Instrument by State, Year 
State 
2001 2006 2010 Total 
change 
2001-
2010 
Command
-and-
control 
Market-
based  
Informa
tion 
All RE 
Policies 
Command
-and-
control 
Market-
based  
Informa
tion 
All RE 
Policies 
Comman
d-and-
control 
Market-
based  
Informa
tion 
All RE 
Policies 
Alabama 0 2 0 2 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 1 
Arizona 2 5 1 8 2 3 1 6 3 6 0 9 1 
Arkansas 2 3 0 5 1 1 0 2 1 1 0 2 -3 
California 3 5 1 9 4 7 1 12 4 6 1 11 2 
Colorado 0 3 1 4 2 2 1 5 2 6 2 10 6 
Connecticut 3 5 1 9 4 5 1 10 4 7 1 12 3 
Delaware 2 1 0 3 3 3 1 7 3 4 2 9 6 
Florida 1 3 1 5 1 2 1 4 2 6 1 9 4 
Georgia 1 1 0 2 1 2 0 3 1 6 0 7 5 
Idaho 0 4 0 4 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 1 
Illinois 1 2 1 4 2 2 1 5 3 6 1 10 6 
Indiana 0 4 0 4 1 3 0 4 1 6 0 7 3 
Iowa 1 6 0 7 2 8 2 12 2 8 2 12 5 
Kansas 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 2 5 0 7 4 
Kentucky 0 1 0 1 1 2 0 3 1 7 0 8 7 
Louisiana 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 4 1 5 0 6 6 
Maine 3 2 1 6 2 4 1 7 4 6 2 12 6 
Maryland 1 6 0 7 2 8 1 11 2 9 1 12 5 
Massachusetts 2 5 1 8 3 10 1 14 4 11 1 16 8 
Michigan 1 0 1 2 2 4 1 7 4 5 1 10 8 
Minnesota 2 7 0 9 3 7 2 12 3 8 1 12 3 
Mississippi 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Missouri 0 2 0 2 0 4 0 4 2 4 0 6 4 
Montana 2 5 1 8 3 6 2 11 3 7 1 11 3 
Nebraska 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 1 4 0 5 3 
Nevada 2 4 1 7 3 5 1 9 3 6 1 10 3 
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Table 7. Number of Renewable Energy Policy Instrument by State, Year 
 (Continued) 
State 
2001 2006 2010 Total 
change 
2001-
2010 
Command
-and-
control 
Market-
based  
Informa
tion 
All RE 
Policies 
Command
-and-
control 
Market-
based  
Informa
tion 
All RE 
Policies 
Comman
d-and-
control 
Market-
based  
Informa
tion 
All RE 
Policies 
New 
Hampshire 1 3 1 5 1 3 0 4 2 5 0 7 2 
New Jersey 3 3 1 7 4 7 1 12 3 9 1 13 6 
New Mexico 2 2 0 4 1 6 1 8 2 7 1 10 6 
New York 3 7 0 10 4 10 1 15 4 10 1 15 5 
North Carolina 0 4 0 4 0 5 0 5 2 8 0 10 6 
North Dakota 0 4 0 4 0 6 0 6 0 5 0 5 1 
Ohio 2 5 0 7 2 8 1 11 3 8 1 12 5 
Oklahoma 0 1 0 1 0 3 0 3 0 4 0 4 3 
Oregon 2 7 0 9 2 8 1 11 4 10 2 16 7 
Pennsylvania 1 2 1 4 4 3 1 8 3 6 1 10 6 
Rhode Island 2 6 0 8 2 5 1 8 2 8 1 11 3 
South Carolina 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 1 5 0 6 6 
South Dakota 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 2 0 3 2 
Tennessee 0 2 0 2 0 3 0 3 0 5 0 5 3 
Texas 1 5 1 7 2 4 1 7 2 5 1 8 1 
Utah 1 1 0 2 2 5 0 7 2 6 0 8 6 
Vermont 1 2 0 3 2 3 1 6 2 10 0 12 9 
Virginia 1 4 0 5 1 4 1 6 1 6 2 9 4 
Washington 0 5 1 6 1 5 2 8 2 5 2 9 3 
West Virginia 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 3 1 4 0 5 5 
Wisconsin 3 4 0 7 3 6 0 9 4 8 0 12 5 
Wyoming 1 2 0 3 1 3 0 4 1 3 0 4 1 
Average 1.10 3.17 .33 4.60 1.60 4.29 .63 6.52 2.04 5.98 .65 8.67 4.06 
Total 53.00 152.00 16.00 221.00 77.00 206.00 30.00 313.00 98.00 287.00 31.00 416.00 195.00 
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Diversity and Coerciveness of Policy Instruments 
To answer the questions whether state governments have diversified their policy 
instruments for supporting the deployment of renewable energy, a detailed investigation 
on is made on the states’ use of renewable energy policies. The renewable energy policies 
and programs that were most frequently adopted and implemented by state governments 
in 2001 were economic regulations, and as such these were classified as market 
instruments in this study. 31 states applied net-metering systems to their electricity 
markets and introduced access laws to recognize and protect accessibility to solar or wind 
as a property right. In 2010, about a quarter of the states gave various tax benefits for the 
investment and installation of renewable energy technologies: corporate tax (10 states), 
personal tax (11 states), property tax (16 states), and sales tax (12 states) credits. 
However, some programs or incentives such as green power purchasing programs, 
production incentives, or required green power options were rarely used by states’ 
renewable energy policy designs back in 2001.    
Overall states introduced a larger number of programs and policies in their 
renewable energy policy portfolios between 2001 and 2010. Policy instruments also 
became more diversified in the sense that new policy instruments—green power 
purchasing, production incentives, green power option—were introduced and adopted 
during the period. Forty one states implemented net-metering programs as of 2010. 
Interconnection standards have been adopted and applied in 41 state and 25 states 
adopted them since 2001. Thirty five states have adopted solar or wind access laws with 
voluntary easements. Twenty eight states of the 48 states have implemented renewable 
portfolio standards.  
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In the beginning of governmental intervention into renewable electricity markets, 
back in the early 2000s, the most popular approaches were net-metering and access laws. 
These are economic regulations that reduce market barriers and provide assurance of 
property rights for solar and wind access. State governments began setting up electric 
power markets favorable to renewable energy developers by using policy instruments 
characterized by medium level coerciveness, rather than highly coercive command-and-
control instruments. During and after the period of electricity restructuring, however, 
very coercive command-and-control instruments—RPS, interconnection and PBFs—have 
been adopted in many states; also information disclosure of power industries has been 
mandated in many states during the time period. Financial incentives including various 
tax expenditures, and governmental subsidies and grants have increasingly been adopted 
as states’ policy instruments supporting renewable energy development. For recent years, 
new policy instruments such as performance-based or production incentives and green 
power options have been introduced and adopted at the state level.  
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Table 8. Number of States with Renewable Energy Policies 
Policy 
Instruments Illustrative Tools 
Renewable Energy  
Policies and Programs 2001 2006 2010 
Command 
-and- 
Control 
Obligations 
Green Power Purchasing 2 7 3 
RPS 11 20 28 
PBF 14 15 17 
License/process 
standard 
Contractor License 10 7 9 
Interconnection 16 28 41 
Market-Based 
Market systems 
Net-Metering 31 35 41 
Access Laws 31 30 35 
Subsidies and 
Grants 
 
Rebates 9 17 22 
Grants 10 17 23 
Loans 13 21 35 
Production Incentives 1 6 9 
Tax Expenditures 
Corporate Tax Credit 10 15 22 
Personal Tax Credit 11 15 21 
Property Tax Credit 16 26 32 
Sales Tax Credit 12 17 27 
Industry Support 8 7 20 
Information Information 
Disclosure 16 25 22 
Required Green Power Option 0 5 9 
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5.3 Regression Results 
5.3.1 Estimation Issues 
In order to find out an appropriate statistical analysis model for the time-series 
cross sectional data, this study performed and compared three different models: pooled 
OLS regression analysis, random-effects, and fixed-effects estimates analyses. Analyses 
were performed on 480 observations: 48 states for the time period from year 2001 
through 2010. The fixed-effects and pooled OLS regression models are based on the 
assumption of a linear relationship between variables, while random-effects models are 
based on feasible generalized least squares. This study transformed the dependent and 
independent variables to build a base model which meets the assumptions of ordinary 
least square regression best. This section describes the process through which the final 
panel model was decided.  
First of all, the research examined the skewness of the distribution of dependent 
and independent variables, and transformed whichever ones needed to be transformed to 
achieve a normal or symmetric distribution. The outcome variables of this study, MWh of 
electricity generated from renewable sources and the share of renewable electricity, both 
had right-skewed distributions. Among various methods used for handling asymmetric 
distributions of measures, this study used a natural log transformation. This is a popular 
means to normalize univariate data (See Appendix C). The natural log transformation 
resulted in a distribution more nearly symmetric and closer to a normal distribution for 
both variables. Also, the measures of most of independent variables were skewed to the 
right. For normally distributed measures of independent variables, a natural log 
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transformation was used. Those variables are electricity price, natural gas price, shares of 
nuclear and hydro power, electricity export ratio, per capita GSP, shares of fossil fuel 
manufacturing and mining industry, number of Sierra Club membership per 1,000 capita, 
state and local governmental employees, and wind energy potential. Renewable energy 
policy instrument indices and the average congressional House voting scores on 
environmental issues were nearly normally distributed.  
Next, this study compared three different panel regressions—pooled OLS, 
random-effects, and fixed-effects regressions—to verify the appropriateness of the 
analytical modeling done in this study. In a previous section, the researcher discussed the 
assumptions and purposes of three panel regression models for the study. The logical 
conclusion was that a fixed-effects model is conceptually most appropriate for the 
purpose of the analysis as well as the virtue of the panel data used in this study. The 
fixed-effects model is also attractive when a study intends to investigate the causes of 
changes within an entity. With adjustment for heteroskedasticity, a fixed-effects estimate 
usually provides a valid inference (Wooldridge, 2011).  
The following paragraphs introduce the step-by-step process of statistical model 
selection this study. Park (2011)’s guidelines suggest to begin with pooled OLS 
regression model, and to examine whether or not there is observed or unobserved 
heterogeneity, that is, cross-sectional or time-series effects. This study thus started with a 
pooled OLS without fixed and/or random effects as a base model. Then, this base model 
was compared to a least square dummy variable (LSDV) model with year dummy 
variables for year specific effects as well as to a LSDV with state dummy variables, in 
order to examine the existence of state fixed effects.  
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As expected on the basis of the literature review and research design sections, the 
results found evidence of time effect. Unobserved year fixed effects existed in two 
respective models. The first was on in which the dependent variable was log transformed 
MWh of electricity generated from non-hydro renewable sources. The second was on in 
which the dependent variable was log transformed share of renewable electricity. For 
both models, LSDV with year dummy variables fitted the data better than the pooled 
OLS. The R square increased; F statistic increased; while sum of squares due to residual 
(SSE) decreased. 
The results of the LSDV models with state dummy variables showed strong 
evidence of the unobserved heterogeneity of individual (or state) effects. State dummy 
variables significantly improved the goodness-of-fit of models: R-squared increased; the 
model F statistic increased; and sum of squared errors (SSE) decreased in both models 
with two different outcome measures. 
Given the substantial evidence of unobserved heterogeneity due to state-specific 
and/or year-specific effects, the researcher then employed a Breusch-Pagan Lagrange 
multiplier (LM) test. The LM test is usually conducted to decide between a pooled OLS 
and random-effects regression. The null hypothesis of the LM test was that state-specific 
or year-specific error variance components were zero (homoscedasticity). That is, the null 
hypothesis was that there was no significant difference across states over years (Breusch 
and Pagan, 1980). Test results rejected the null hypothesis. Therefore it was determined 
that a random effects model is appropriate as compared to an OLS regression for both 
models with different dependent variables (See Appendix D.1 and D.2). 
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Next, a Hausman test was conducted to decide between fixed-effects and random-
effects estimates for the base regression model with year dummy variables. The basic 
idea of Hausman test is to test whether there is heterogeneity or unique errors correlated 
with the regressors (Hausman, 1978; Wooldridge, 2012). The null hypothesis of the 
Hausman test was that the random-effects and fixed-effects estimates are not different. In 
general, a fixed effect model is favorable when the null hypothesis is rejected (Hausman, 
1978; Wooldridge, 2012). Even though many prior scholars (Baltagi, 2001; Wooldridge, 
2012) proved that the fixed-effects estimate is more convincing model for the purpose of 
policy analysis, a formal test for a statistically significant difference between random- 
and fixed-effects models is also common (Wooldridge, 2012). In this research, Hausman 
tests on the two different dependent variables both rejected the null hypothesis (See 
Appendix D.1 and D.2). This means that there exist state-fixed unique errors in the panel 
data of this study. The researcher, therefore, decided to employ fixed-effects regression 
models for the analysis.  
Given the decision to use fixed-effect estimate models, this study conducted 
several post-estimate diagnostics tests for cross-sectional dependence, heteroskedasticity, 
and serial correlation of residual. Because the fixed-effects regression applies the OLS 
estimators, the classical assumptions of OLS regression on residuals/error be considered: 
independent and identical (or homoscedastic) distribution of errors.  
The presence of special correlation of residuals can bias the analysis results. 
Cross-sectional dependence is more problematic in macro panels with long time-series 
(over 20-30 years) than in micro panels according to Baltagi (2001). Although this study 
has 10 years of time-series, a residual diagnostic test for contemporaneous correlation 
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was conducted. To test whether the residuals resulted from a fixed-effect regression are 
correlated across states, Pasaran cross-sectional dependence (CD) test was used. The null 
hypothesis of the test is uncorrelated residuals. Test results for both regressions—with 
amount of electricity generated from renewable resources and with share of renewable 
electricity—did not find statistically significant cross-sectional dependence of residuals 
(See Appendix D.1 and D.2).  
A test for the OLS assumption of homoskedastic distribution of residuals was also 
conducted. Non-constant variance of errors does not lead to biased parameter estimates, 
but p-values are unreliable. A modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity in 
fixed-effect regression was conducted (Greene, 2000; Baum, 2001). The null hypothesis 
of the test is constant variance of residuals for all cross-sectional units. The test results 
rejected the null hypothesis, so the presence of heteroskedastic residuals was detected for 
both models.  
Serially correlated residuals of cross-sectional time series regression based on 
OLS estimates can bias the standard errors and make the results less efficient (Drukker, 
2003). Baltagi (2008) argues that the residuals of linear panel data regression are likely to 
be serially correlated because a dynamic effect of shocks is usually distributed over years. 
This study used the test suggested by Wooldridge (2003) for diagnostic of autocorrelation 
of residuals. Woodridge’s test uses the residuals from a first-difference regression, which 
removed the effects of time-invariant covariates and constant (Drukker, 2003). The null 
hypothesis is no serial correlation of residuals. Wooldridge’s tests showed that there are 
statistically significant first-order autocorrelation in the residuals of fixed-effects models 
of the panel data. 
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Although tests for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation of residuals in panel 
regressions have become routinely (Born and Breitung, 2010; Yin and Powers, 2010; 
Chrimali and Kniefel, 2011), some previous studies on the effects of renewable energy 
policies did not take seriously account of the violation of these assumptions (Carley, 
2009). Diagnostic test results showed that the panel data of this study has heteroskedastic 
and serially correlated residuals with fixed-effects regressions with year-fixed dummy 
variables (See Appendix D.1 and D.2). In order to adjust for heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation of residuals, this study employed the “cluster-robust” or consistent (HAC) 
standard errors suggested by Wooldridge (2003) and Druckker (2003).  
5.3.2 Regression results 
The fixed-effects estimates with cluster-robust standard errors including year-
fixed dummy variables proved to be the best suitable analytical model for the 
longitudinal data of this study in terms of the statistical diagnostics test results as well as 
the policy analysis purpose of the study. 
Table 9 presents the result from the fixed-effects estimates with a dependent 
variable equal to the total amount of electricity generation from non-hydro renewable 
sources. Cluster-robust standard errors, errors clustered by states, are used to account for 
the heteroskedasticity and serial autocorrelation found in the model (Drukker, 2003; 
Wooldridge, 2003). The primary independent variables of interest are three policy 
instrument indices for renewable energy developments.  
The result demonstrates that the number of command-and-control type of policy 
instruments adopted by a state government has a positive and significant association with 
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the amount of electricity generated from non-hydro renewable sources (t=2.73, p=.009), 
all else being equal. In other words, the increase of states’ electricity generated from non-
hydro renewable sources over the past decade can be significantly attributed at least in 
part to the use of more diversified command-and-control type of policies that state 
governments have adopted to enforce electric power suppliers to use more renewable 
energy technologies.  
On the other hand, the market approach index (t=-1.27, p=.211) and information 
instrument index (t= 1.19, p=.238) do not have statistically significant associations with 
the amount of renewable electricity generation in states. States’ introduction of additional 
policy instruments based on economic incentives to date has not shown to be effective in 
affecting the increase of electricity generation using non-hydro renewable sources in 
states, all else being equal. Also, the increase of renewable electricity generation in recent 
years is not statistically significantly explained by the adoption of information disclosure 
or green power options program, with which state governments mandate electric power 
suppliers to provide customers such information on the sources of electricity generation 
of companies and to offer customers to choose electricity generated using renewables. 
The fixed-effects estimates result in Table 9 shows significant predictors of the 
amount of renewable electricity generation. This study hypothesized that states’ 
characteristics of natural endowment, economy, political environment, and electric 
market conditions together with governmental intervention determine the electricity 
producers’ behavior on renewable electricity generation. The result shows that states’ 
natural endowment measured by wind energy potential has a statistically significant and 
positive association (t=3.08, p=.003) with net electricity generation using non-hydro 
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renewable sources. It demonstrates that wind speed in a state influences the generation of 
renewable electricity, all else being equal.   
Among the state economic factors expected to affect the power industry’s 
electricity generation using renewable sources, state wealth is a significant predictor of 
renewable electricity generation in states. This study measures state wealth as per capita 
gross state product (GSP) and the analytic results show a statistically significant and 
positive association (t=2.39, p=.021) between a state’s per capita GSP and the amount of 
renewable electricity generated in the state. This can be understood that wealthier states 
deploy more renewable energy technologies to produce electricity. Other economic 
factors representing industrial structure of mining industry and fossil fuel interest groups 
however are not statistically significant in the model. 
The result demonstrates that citizen’s interest and preference toward 
environmental issues are related to states’ renewable electricity generation. Table 5.7 
shows that the number of Sierra Club membership per thousand state population has a 
highly significant and positive association (t=2.79, p=.008) with the amount of renewable 
electricity generation within a state.  
Other two variables indicating states’ political environment, democrat 
governorship and the degree of state legislators’ preference for environmental issues, 
were also assumed to affect states’ decision on renewable energy policy adoption and 
implementation. The political affiliation of governors to the democrat party shows a 
positive sign (t=1.41, p=.165), but is not statistically significant with cluster-robust 
standard errors. State legislators’ preference favorable to environmental issues also does 
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not show a significant influence on the increase of electricity generation using non-hydro 
renewable energy technologies. This can be understood that once renewable energy 
policies have decided policy decision makers such as governors or legislators are unable 
to affect the use of renewable energy technologies in the electric power industry.  
The electricity demand and the cost of electricity resource in states are significant 
predictors of states’ net generation of renewable electricity. Table 9 shows that the 
coefficient of electricity demand in a state, measured by total MWh of electricity sales 
within the state, is highly significant and positive (t=2.4, p=0.02). This means that the 
amount of renewable electricity is accordingly determined by the size of electricity 
markets in a state.  The wholesale price of natural gas purchased by electric power 
industries in a state shows a significant and positive association at marginal level (t=1.92, 
p=0.061) with the net generation of renewable electricity within the state. This means that 
electric power producers are more likely to invest in or to deploy renewable energy 
technologies when natural gas prices, a portion of the cost of production, rises for seeking 
alternative cost competitive energy sources. However, the average retail price of 
electricity, the proportions of nuclear and conventional hydro power generation, the share 
of investor-owned utilities in total MWh of electricity sales, and the export/import ratio 
of electricity in states are not statistically significant predictors of the amount of 
renewable electricity production.  
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Table 9. Regression results for logged total MWh of renewable electricity generation 
from non-hydro renewable sources 
Variables Fixed Effects 
Command-and-control  0.156 (0.057)*** 
Market-Based Approach -0.033 (0.026) 
Information Instruments 0.139 (0.116) 
Wind potential (ln) 0.559 (0.182)*** 
Per capita GSP (ln) 1.955 (0.819)** 
% Fossil Fuel Manufacturing (ln) 0.042 (0.07) 
% Mining (ln) 0.05 (0.049) 
Sierra Membership (per 1,000) (ln) 1.116 (0.4)** 
Democrat Governor  0.128 (0.09)  
LCV House Score 0.001 (0.002) 
State&Local NR Emp (per million) (ln) -0.123 (0.226) 
Total Electricity Sales (ln) 3.322 (1.382)** 
Natural Gas Price (ln ) 0.589 (0.307)* 
Electricity Price (ln) -0.048 (0.188) 
% Nuclear Power (ln) 0.289 (0.546) 
% Hydro Power (ln) 0.043 (0.088) 
% IOU (ln) 0.393 (0.357) 
Electricity Export Ratio (ln) 0.201 (0.171) 
Year 2002a 0.002 (0.091) 
Year 2003 -0.113 (0.088) 
Year 2004 -0.1 (0.182) 
Year 2005 -0.224 (0.209) 
Year 2006 -0.067 (0.214) 
Year 2007 -0.097 (0.243) 
Year 2008 0.037 (0.197) 
Year 2009 0.678 (0.219)*** 
Year 2010 0.677 (0.247)*** 
Constant -73.530 (23.220) 
R-squred .61  
Adjusted R-squared .59  
Observations 480  
Number of state fixed effects 48  
F-test (model) 7.05***  
Model degrees of freedom (with 48 clusters) 26  
Note: Cluster-robust standard error in parenthesis; *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. 
a
 Omitted category: Year 2001 
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Table 10 displays the results of fixed-effects estimates for the logged share of 
non-hydro renewable electricity generation. The dependent variable in this model is the 
percentage of non-hydro renewable electricity that measures the relative use of non-hydro 
renewable energy technologies and resources of the electric power industry in states. The 
variation in the share of non-hydro renewables electricity generated in states’ electric 
power industry indicates how policy instruments and other factors influence electricity 
suppliers alter their decision and behavior on renewable electricity generation. Table 10 
presents the coefficients and cluster-robust standard errors of variables, including year 
dummies. This study corrected the standard errors which are heteroskedastic and auto 
correlated, by applying cluster-robust standards errors clustered on states (Wooldridge 
2003).  
This study hypothesized that the more command-and-control type of policy 
instrument state governments adopt the more renewable electricity is generated in the 
electric power market. The command-and-control policy instrument index is positive and 
significant at 95 percent confidence level (t=2.01, p=.05), all else being equal. This 
model also demonstrates that additional adoption of command-and-control type of policy 
instruments increase the proportion of renewable sources used for electricity production 
in states. In other words, when state governments adopt and implement more diversified 
command-and-control instruments, one observes a significant replacement of electric 
power sources from other conventional sources to non-hydro renewable sources.56  
                                                          
56
 According to an EIA’s report, Electric Power Monthly (2013), between 2001 and 2011, the share of 
electricity generated from non-hydro renewable sources increased from 1.9% to 5.4%, while the proportion 
of coal power declined from 51% to 37.4%, natural gas increased from 17% to 30.5%; and petroleum liquid 
usage in electricity generation dropped from 3% to 0.3% in the United States.  Retrieved from 
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/epm_table_grapher.cfm?t=epmt_1_1, on March 27, 2013. 
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Information instruments index has a statistically significant and positive 
association (t=1.79, p=.08) with the share of renewable electricity at 90 percent 
confidence level. Although the effect is for all practical purposes a marginal one, states’ 
intervention into the electric power market using informative and voluntary policy 
instruments such as information disclosure or green power options seemed to affect 
power suppliers to alter their source of energy production from others to non-hydro 
renewables, all else being equal.  
Among the three categories of policy instruments, market-based policy 
instruments appear to be the least effective in the renewable energy market. The result 
demonstrates that additional adoption of market-based instruments by a state is not a 
statistically significant determinant of an increase of the share of renewable electricity in 
the state (t=-1.21, p=.231).   
In addition to the effects of the three categories of policy instruments that state 
governments implement, this model explained the increase of renewable share of 
electricity generation with wind potential, state economic and political environments, and 
electricity market conditions in states. Wind energy potential is also significant and 
positive (t=3.34, p=.002). All else being equal, the variation of the share of renewable 
sources in electricity generation is partially but significantly attributable to annual 
average wind speed in states.   
States’ economic wealth explains the proportion of non-hydro renewables in 
electricity generation of the states. All else being equal, per capita gross product in states 
has a statistically significant and positive association (t=2.44, p=.018) with the share of 
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renewable electricity in states. This can be understood to mean that when a state 
economically grows, the state is likely to seek alternative energy sources that possibly 
replace the conventional source of energy, which is today fossil fuels.  
The size of the total electricity demand in a state does not statistically 
significantly explain the relative use of renewable sources in electricity generation in the 
state (t=1.19, p=.241). As seen in the first model (Table 9), the amount of renewable 
electricity generation increases as the electricity demand/consumption in a state grows. 
However, increasing demand for electricity does not affect electric power producers’ 
choice between conventional and renewable sources.  
Instead, interestingly enough, the ratio of net electricity generation (MWh) to total 
electricity sales (MWh) in a state is strongly related to the proportion of the use of 
renewable sources in power production in the state. The ratio of electricity generation to 
sales in a state measures whether the state exports or imports electricity. The assumption 
is that if a state’s net generation of electricity exceeds the total electricity sales in MWh 
within the state, the state will export its excess to other states and vice versa. The analysis 
result shows that states’ electricity export ratio or generation to sales ratio has a 
statistically significant and negative association (t=-2.67, p=.01) with the share of 
renewable electricity generation. In other word, a state that imports electricity from 
outside uses more renewable energy technologies in electricity production within the 
state. 
The wholesale price of natural gas in states is positive and statically significant 
(t=2.1, p=.041), all else being equal. This analytic result demonstrates that the price of 
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conventional power sources, natural gas in particular, affects the decision of power 
producers on the source of electricity generation. When natural gas prices increase, states 
increase either/or their investment in or operation of renewable energy technologies, 
probably due to the relative competitiveness of renewables.   
Citizen’s interest in environmental issues is also evidently a significant 
determinant of the relative use of non-hydro renewables for power generation under 
given policy designs and electric market conditions. Table 10 shows a positive and 
statistically significant association between the relative size of a state’s Sierra Club 
membership and the share of renewable resource in electricity generation in that state 
(t=2.34, p=.024), all else being equal. This means that the more people become interested 
in and get involved in environmental issues, the larger proportion of electricity is 
produced using renewable energy technologies in states. 
Other variables measured for states’ political and legislative preference toward 
environmental issues are not statistically significant in the analysis with the share of 
renewable electricity (Table 10). Coefficients of both political affiliation of governor 
(t=1.53, p=.133) and average house voting score for environmental issues (t=.94, p=.354) 
have positive signs with the proportion of renewables in net electricity generation, but 
neither of them are statistically significant.  
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Table 10. Regression results for logged share of renewable electricity generation 
Variables Fixed Effects 
Command-and-control  0.102 (0.051)** 
Market-Based Approach -0.031 (0.025) 
Information Instruments 0.204 (0.114)* 
Wind potential (ln) 0.577 (0.173)*** 
Per capita GSP (ln) 2.035 (0.834)** 
% Fossil Fuel Manufacturing (ln) 0.054 (0.064) 
% Mining (ln) 0.040 (0.046) 
Sierra Membership (per 1,000) (ln) 0.950 (0.407)** 
Democrat Governor  0.121 (0.079) 
LCV House Score 0.003 (0.003) 
State&Local NR Emp (per million) (ln) -0.014 (0.252) 
Total Electricity Sales (ln) 1.545 (1.300) 
Natural Gas Price (ln ) 0.605 (0.288)** 
Electricity Price (ln) -0.079 (0.212) 
% Nuclear Power (ln) 0.086 (0.522) 
% Hydro Power (ln) -0.007 (0.068) 
% IOU (ln) 0.207 (0.334) 
Electricity Export Ratio (ln) -0.452 (0.169)*** 
Year 2002 -0.014 (0.080) 
Year 2003 -0.125 (0.079) 
Year 2004 -0.166 (0.153) 
Year 2005 -0.279 (0.178) 
Year 2006 -0.139 (0.182) 
Year 2007 -0.154 (0.210) 
Year 2008 0.009 (0.193) 
Year 2009 0.617 (0.207)*** 
Year 2010 0.619 (0.236)** 
Constant -54.738 (22.119) 
R-squared .58  
Adjusted R-squared .56  
Observations 480  
Number of state fixed effects 48  
F-test (model) 5.00***  
Model degrees of freedom (with 48 clusters) 26  
Note: Cluster-robust standard error in parenthesis; *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. 
a
 Omitted category: Year 2001 
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5.4 Findings  
The fixed-effects models of this study, using two separate operational definitions 
of renewable energy development showed very consistent results. The analytic results 
supported the primary research hypotheses of this study on the effectiveness of three 
types of policy instruments. Also, this study found meaningful results regarding other 
control variables. Those variables significantly associated with the increase of renewable 
electricity production supported the hypothetical relationship that this study derived from 
the literature review.  
Hypothesis 1 was about the implementation of command-and-control types of 
renewable energy policy instruments and the deployment of renewable energy 
technologies in electricity production. This study hypothesized that a state with more 
command-and-control type of policy instruments will deploy more renewable energy. 
The results of both fixed-effects models demonstrated the significant and positive 
associations of command-and-control policy instrument index with the net generation of 
renewable electricity as well as with the share of non-hydro renewables in electricity 
production in states.  
The second research hypothesis was that the diversification of market-based 
policy instruments is not associated with an increase in renewable energy generation in 
states. The fixed-effects models failed to reject the null hypothesis that there is no 
significant relationship between the number of market-based instruments and both the 
amount of electricity generation from renewables and the proportion of renewable 
electricity, all else being equal.  
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Hypothesis 3 was about the effectiveness of the additional adoption of 
informative policy instruments. The fixed-effects model with the amount of electricity 
generation from non-hydro renewable sources failed to reject null hypothesis. Therefore, 
the increase of the amount of renewable electricity generation was evidently not 
attributable to the number of information instruments adopted by states. However, the 
analysis with dependent variable measured by relative use (%) of non-hydro renewables 
in electric power production supported the hypothesis. The more a state diversified 
information instruments, the larger share of electricity generated from renewable sources. 
More detailed interpretation and policy implications will be discussed in the following 
section regarding inconsistent analytical results on hypothesis 3. 
Regarding other variables, not all variables show significant associations with the 
increase of renewable electricity generation, but all five components of factors—natural 
resource, economic, political, and market circumstances and state policies—were found 
to affect deployment of non-hydro renewables. More details are discussed in the 
discussion section. 
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CHAPTER VI 
DISCUSSION 
 
 
6.1 Conclusion 
The primary purpose of this study was to examine the effectiveness of three 
different types of policy instruments implemented by state governments to support 
renewable energy development. This was accomplished by first analyzing currently 
adopted states’ legislative renewable energy programs and incentives, then by classifying 
them into three categories of policy approaches: command-and-control, market-based, 
and information instruments.  
There was a significant increase in the overall number of policy instruments that 
state governments introduced for renewable energy development between 2001 and 2010. 
Popular policy instruments have changed with time. In the very beginning of 
governmental intervention, the role of governments was to set foundational rules for 
renewable energy suppliers. Afterward, command-and-control instruments, represented 
by renewable portfolio standards, have been adopted in many states. State governments 
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began using authoritative and coercive policy tools to alter the behavior of electricity 
producers to use more renewable sources. With Federal support for the renewable energy 
industry, state governments have also provided a variety of financial incentives to 
renewable energy developers. To date, states have continued to develop new policy 
instruments including information instruments and financial incentives.  
This study then analyzed the effectiveness of the policy instruments which have 
been diversified over time. The researcher expected that additional adoption of 
command-and-control or information instruments would positively affect electricity 
production from renewable sources, holding other factors constant. Diversification of 
market-based instruments, however, was suspected to have significant impact on the 
increase of renewable power generation. For the most part, the analysis results supported 
the primary research hypotheses. 
The increase in the amount and share of renewable electricity both were attributed 
by adoption of more command-and-control instruments. This implies that the 
diversification of authoritative and coercive approaches of state governments’ 
intervention in electric power industries has effectively altered the power suppliers’ 
choice of energy sources from conventional to non-hydro renewables. Even though 
regulatory approaches have been criticized with respect to cost-effectiveness and 
flexibility, authoritative and coercive governance tools have been effective in achieving 
policy goals at the early stage of governmental intervention. Moreover they have been 
effective specifically in the area where market systems do not generate socially 
appropriate goods and services (Harrington et al., 2004).  
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Regarding market-based instruments, results did not find significant evidence of 
effectiveness. The results verified the theoretical arguments that market-based policy 
instruments or economic incentives do not guarantee the achievement of policy goals 
(Hammar, 2006; Harrington, et al., 2004). The results are also consistent with prior 
empirical studies that examined the influence of financial incentives on renewable energy 
capacity or production (Delmas and Montes, 2011). 
Over the past decade and a half, states have developed and adopted a variety of 
market-based policy instruments for the purpose of increasing electricity production 
using renewable sources. However, the analytic results show some evidence that the use 
of diverse market-based instruments does not always result in policy effectiveness. A 
possible explanation is that these market-based instruments, adopted by states, failed to 
incentivize or motivate people to use renewable energy technologies in electricity 
production. While market players in the electric power industry benefited from using 
given market-based instruments, the renewable energy outcome did not meet state 
governments’ expectations (Hammar, 2006). In either case, the states’ market-based 
policy designs do not seem appropriate or effective as a catalyst for renewable energy 
production. 
Especially, financial incentives including tax expenditures and subsidies or loans 
may mislead the energy market. Electricity producers may enjoy the financial benefits 
from purchasing and installing renewable energy equipment offered by the governments 
to reduce their cost of electricity generation from renewable sources. However, at the 
same time, electricity producers may want to invest more, as much as they save from 
governmental support for renewables, in purchasing their conventional sources of 
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electricity such as coal or natural gas. If this is the case, financial incentives can hardly be 
expected to show the expected short-term outcomes in terms of proportion of renewables 
of total electricity generation. 
 This study showed results consistent with prior empirical studies (Yin and Power, 
2009, Shrimali and Kniefel, 2011, Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011) that estimated the 
effects of individual informative programs. They found a positive and significant impact 
of green power options on renewable energy capacity. This study showed that the number 
of information instruments did not explain the amount of electricity generation from 
renewable sources, but helped to explain the share of renewables in electricity production. 
A possible explanation is that information given to consumers does not necessarily 
translate to new investment in renewable energy systems. Instead, the availability of 
information influences electric power producers to choose to alter the power sources from 
conventional to renewable sources. This story is moreover supported by positive and 
significant influence of citizen interest in environmental issues on the amount and share 
of renewable electricity in states. 
The political environment has been expected to affect policy adoption and 
innovation (Yi and Feiock, 2012). However, once policy designs have developed, 
achievement of policy goals depends on policy implementation rather than on state 
legislators or governors’ preference or citizen preference and involvement (represented 
by Sierra Club membership). Put it another way, although different governments may 
intervene in the power market with similar type of policy instruments, market incentives 
in particular, people may or may not be motivated to alter their behavior depending on 
their pre-existing interest and preference toward the environment and green energy. 
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Citizens with favorable preferences toward environmental issues could either be 
consumers or producers of electricity, or both. As consumers, they could exercise their 
pressure on electric power utilities to use clean energy sources. Or, they also can generate 
renewable electricity as independent power producers, or produce combined heat and 
power produced using renewable energy equipment. 
As seen in the results, state wealth measured by per capita GSP was the single 
most important factor accounting for variation in the increase in electricity production 
using renewable sources. Such results suggest that wealthy states have more interest and 
capacity to invest in environmentally friendly projects (Ringquist, 1994; Sapat, 2004), 
which is consistent results what previous empirical studies found (Carley, 2009; Shrimali 
and Kniefel, 2011; Delmas and Monte-Sancho, 2010). Even though this study examined 
the impact of state wealth on renewable electricity production, it is possible that the state 
wealth induces investment in clean energy industry either from inside or outside state 
developers.  
Pre-existing conditions of the electricity market also significantly affect the actual 
use of renewable source for electricity production in a given year. As the U.S. 
experienced in the early 1990s and 2000s, natural gas price inversely correlates with  
investment in renewable energy technologies. A huge decline in natural gas prices in the 
early 90s hindered the growth rate of renewable energy as industry stagnated; the Energy 
Crisis in California in early 2000s motivated Western states to invest more in alternative 
power sources. 
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Interestingly, the average retail price of electricity does not seem significant in 
both models, while natural gas price consistently seem to serve as a significant factor. 
This implies that electricity suppliers care about the cost-effectiveness or efficiency and 
consider non-hydro renewables as their alternative resources to reduce the cost of 
production. On the other hand, the sales price or retail price at which consumers purchase 
electricity does not seem to influence power suppliers’ choice of power sources in any 
ways. 
States’ experience of importing electricity is also an important determinant of the 
relative use of renewable sources for electricity generation. The more a state imports 
electricity from other states, the larger the share of renewable electricity. This study 
assumed that those states with export of a greater proportion of electricity are less likely 
to replace their conventional sources of electricity production with non-hydro renewables. 
Conversely, those states where import more electricity from other states for their in-state 
consumption are likely to use relatively more renewable sources to produce electricity. It 
is also possible that a state may increase its import of electricity from other states by 
intention of exporting carbon emissions generated from coal-fired power production, 
while promoting renewable energy technologies within the state. 
The results showed that the coefficients of year dummies 2009 and 2010 in both 
models are consistently significant and positive compared to year 2001. It was originally 
expected that the economic recession between 2008 and 2010 would slow the increase in 
energy sector, also tempering with the growing renewable industry. However, at least 
partially due to the heavy investment offered by the Federal Stimulus Package--cash 
grant in lieu of tax credit to renewable energy project developers under ARRA of 2009-- 
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renewable electricity has increasingly generated during the period of economic recession. 
In fact, between 2008 and 2010 average annual growth rate of the total amount of 
renewable electricity, from non-hydro renewable sources, was 16.7%, more than twice 
the average annual growth rate of the previous three years (8.2%) in the U.S.57 The 
results of this study with significant year dummies 2009 and 2010 give us evidence of the 
effectiveness of Federal stimulus package under ARRA of 2009. In other words, Federal 
government’s active supports for renewable energy projects, in addition to state specific 
economic and political characteristics and state government led policy designs, 
influenced the overall growth of the renewable electricity industry since 2009. 
6.2 Policy Implications 
There was significant variation in renewable energy policy designs among states 
over time. However, some commonalities among these policy instruments also emerged. 
Without a well-designed policy evaluation, it is hard to say if states have developed and 
used the policy instruments due to the effectiveness or policy diffusion effects across 
neighboring states.   
To date, command-and-control types of policy instruments such as renewable 
portfolio standards have been regarded as the dominant and effective tools in the electric 
power markets for an increase of renewable electricity production. However, it is too 
early to assume that the authoritative and coercive policy approach is the best instrument. 
It is only in the recent years that the government has intervened in the electricity market 
                                                          
57
 Calculation of the average annual growth is done by the author. Electricity data is from the Energy 
Information Administration. 
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using the command-and-control instruments, which have the possibility to achieve policy 
goals at a faster rate than other instruments (Harrington et al. 2004).  
Similarly the insignificant effects of market-based instruments revealed by the 
analysis results do not mean that state governments need to stop financial supports for 
renewable energy developers. The market-approach may take a longer time to affect the 
electric power industry. We may need to wait until the investment in renewable energy 
technologies and equipment are effectively operating. Another issue is the possibility that 
Federal support for renewable energy industries, under the ARRA of 2010, diminished 
the impact of states-setting incentive systems for the renewable energy market. In that 
case, continuing experiments and evaluation of market-based policy instruments are 
necessary for improvement of policy designs.  
Over the long history of the federal government’s support for electric power 
sectors using fossil fuel and nuclear power, renewable electricity has been at a 
competitive disadvantage. As long as fossil fuel or nuclear-based electricity is being 
incentivized, renewable energy policies, especially financial incentives will experience 
difficulties in taking immediate effects. 
In addition, increased availability of oil and gas achieved by recently permitted 
shale drilling in the U.S. may put a brake on the recent trend of increasing deployment of 
renewable energy technologies. As oil and gas extraction businesses boom, the market 
equilibrium of supply and demand would move the natural gas price downward, which 
affects electric power producers’ choice of power sources, consistent with the analysis 
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results. Therefore, policy makers must have a comprehensive consideration when they 
make policy designs for renewable energy development.  
Analytical results showed that both informative/voluntary instruments and social 
interest in environment are important. Together with citizen “Go Green programs,” 
sermons to the electric industry become important. Under given circumstances, financial 
and institutional capacity, one of the possible and effective ways that state and local 
governments can approach deployment of renewable electricity is to educate and 
enlighten both suppliers and consumers of electricity. Innovative policy instruments such 
as information, education, voluntary agreements, etc. are highly recommended to be 
designed. 
6.3 Strength, limitation, and future direction 
This study has several strengths. First of all, this study makes a contribution to 
policy instrument studies through the practice of classifying policies empirically into 
groups and examining the effectiveness of additional adoption of policy instruments: 
command-and-control, market-based, and information instruments. Previous studies 
(Vedung, 1998; Schneider and Ingram, 1990) conceptually discussed the appropriate 
categorization of policy instruments, while others classified existing policies related to 
renewable energy development into their chosen groups of policy instruments 
(Enzensberger, et al., 2002; Menz, 2005; Beck and Martinot, 2004; Jonstone, et al., 2008). 
However, they rarely applied their classification of policy instruments to an empirical 
analysis of policy evaluation, which relates policy instruments to policy effects.  
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Through the empirical classification of policy instruments, this study found 
several lessons which would help us better understand of policy instruments classification. 
With applying the tri-fold categories of policy instruments—command-and-control, 
market-based, and information—, rather than the degree of coerciveness, the behavioral 
assumption under each policy tool serves as a more helpful and useful criterion for the 
classification. Many previous studies (Vedung, 1998; Salamon, 2002) conceptually 
categorized policy instruments or tools based on the level of coerciveness. This study, 
however, mainly applied the behavioral assumption of policy tools that Schneider and 
Ingram (1990) discussed, with more or less consideration of the degree of government 
authority or coerciveness inherent in policies.  
Because the subject public policies and programs dealt in the research are all state 
legislative policies and many of them mandate energy suppliers a certain types of 
obligations, using the coerciveness criterion was not sufficient to distinguish renewable 
energy policies into three groups of policy instruments. Hence, this study adopted three 
behavioral assumptions through which governments intend to alter policy targets’ 
behavior toward accomplishing policy goals: coercion, use of material resources, and 
intellectual/moral appeals. For instance, generation/environmental disclosure programs 
are requirement set by state legislation for electric utilities to provide customers 
information. This program may appear like a command-and-control type policy 
instrument from the respect of coerciveness because it requires activities of policy targets. 
However, the information disclosure itself does not directly coerce electricity suppliers to 
accomplish a certain goal, rather it can appeal to electricity suppliers’ conscience as well 
as consumer’s intellectual decision making, indirectly influencing electricity generators’ 
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choice of energy sources. Therefore, based on the policy instrument’s behavioral 
assumption, this study assigned the disclosure program in the group of information 
instrument.  
Another lesson is that the market-based instrument defined by this study included 
somewhat too broad range of policies and programs, 11 of 18 renewable energy policies, 
to be considered homogeneous within a group. Net-metering programs and renewable 
energy access laws, in particular, were classified as market-based policy instruments 
under the tri-fold classificatory scheme. However, these two instruments are somewhat 
different in nature from other policies under the group of market-based instrument. Other 
nine market-based policies are all financial incentives directly offered to renewable 
energy suppliers such as tax expenditures, loans, and subsidies, whereas net-metering and 
access laws are adopted to arrange electric market systems preferable to initiating and 
developing renewable electricity generation and distribution. In the future studies, 
especially in the area that has pre-existing market, researchers may want to divide 
market-based policy instruments into more than two groups: one is about financial 
incentives given by governments which change the production cost or market prices of 
goods and services in principle; and the other is about market systems which shift 
demand and/or supply. 
Second possible contribution of this research is building a database of 
comprehensive and historical information on states’ renewable energy policies. Such 
database would enable the measurement of variance of policy instruments utilized by 
states over time. Furthermore, a time-variant measure of policy instrument indices would 
allow policy analysts and policy makers to determine whether the implementation of 
124 
 
diverse policy instruments, classified by regulatory, incentive-based and informative 
policy instruments, is effective in terms of renewable electricity production within a state.  
In addition, this study also has done some to advance a study on the determinants 
and mechanism of the development of renewable energy industries. Results found that 
the amount and share of renewable electricity production in a state is merely affected by 
economic variables such as economy of scale or price of substitutes, but also affected by 
political environments including related policies. 
Although this study contributes to policy instrument studies in terms of exercising 
a tri-fold scheme of policy instruments, it is not without limitation. One limitation 
concerns the intervention of subjectivity in classification of renewable energy policy 
instruments. Renewable energy policies were classified based on theoretical and logical 
classificatory criteria discussed in previous literature. However, due to limited time and 
resources, the classification was conducted by the author, and the inter-subjective 
reliability of the classification has not been tested.  I expect that a survey of experts can 
practically adjust and enhance the classificatory schemes in the future. 
Another limitation deals with the measure of policy instrument indices. This study 
has not considered the degree of relative coerciveness/strictness of policy tools or the 
importance of individual renewable energy policies. Instead, the researcher weighed each 
renewable energy policy or program equally and measured the existence of individual 
renewable energy policies in a state with dummy variables.  
As an extension of my dissertation, I propose to examine the effects of policy 
instruments mixes and to find the appropriate form of policy mix for the multi-level, 
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state-and-local, governance of renewable energy development. Since the 1990s, interest 
in “policy mixes,” has increased (OECD, 2001; Persson, 2006). Combined policy 
instruments were considered to complement and reinforce each other to enhance the 
overall effectiveness and efficiency of policy implementation compared to a single 
instrument (Rist, 1998). In addition, governments implemented multiple types of policy 
tools to solve complex policy issues (Gunningham and Sinclair, 1999; Lafferty and 
Meadowcroft, 1996). Therefore, selecting the most appropriate combination of 
instruments comprises a crucial component of a policy design that would maximize the 
goal achievement and minimize political economic costs (Peters, 2002). 
A very simple methodological approach to look at the effect of policy instrument 
mix will be analyzing the interaction effect coefficients between three policy instruments. 
In addition, I also propose to categorize types of policy instrument mix depending on the 
diversity and magnitude of governments’ policy adoptions. Possible policy mix scenarios 
that I expect include: a state with a full set of command-and-control instruments that uses 
least number of market-based instruments; a state with least use of all instruments; a state 
with a full set of market-based instruments and half of others, etc. Then, I would classify 
observations (states) based on their form of policy instrument mix into 3 or 4 groups and 
those groups will be considered as explanatory variable.  
I also propose to find the determinants of multi-level policy instrument adoption 
for renewable energy development. Applying the types of policy instruments, it is 
expected to discover the mechanism under which local and state governments prefer 
certain types of policy tools or mixes. There are considerable studies on determinants of 
policy innovation and adoption. Before 1990, state government innovation study was 
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dominated by testing internal determinants, national interaction, or diffusion models 
(Balla, 2001; Berry and Berry, 1990; Gray, 1973; Mintrom, 1997; Walker, 1969, etc.). 
Recently, however, alternative forms of diffusion such as vertical influence between 
federal, state, and local governments were suggested (Allen, Pettus, and Haider-Markel, 
2004). Some claim that the motivation for policy diffusion includes both policy learning 
and competition (Boehmke and Witmer, 2004).  Some previous studies employed both 
internal determinants and diffusion effects to analyze determinants of renewable energy 
policy or climate protection policy adoption of local governments (Krause, 2010; 
Matisoff, 2008; Yi and Feiock, 2012).  
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APPENDIX A - E 
Appendix A. Descriptive Analysis of Dependent and Independent Variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Non-hydro Renewable Electricity 480 2,151,752 3,909,227 0.001 27,700,000 
Percentage Non-hydro Renewable 480 3.01 3.83 0.0001 26.08 
Ln Non-hydro Renewable Electricity 480 13.94 1.17 11.57 17.14 
Ln Percentage Non-hydro 
Renewables 
480 0.78 0.93 -1.06 3.27 
Command-and-control 480 1.61 1.31 0 5 
Market-Based Approach 480 4.48 2.34 0 11 
Information Instruments 480 0.59 0.65 0 2 
Total Electricity Sales (ln) 480 17.72 0.97 15.49 19.7 
Natural Gas Price (ln ) 480 7.25 0.14 6.79 7.55 
Electricity Price (ln) 480 18.18 0.67 16.83 19.87 
% Nuclear Power (ln) 480 3.1 0.69 2.27 4.5 
% Hydro Power (ln) 480 0.89 1.77 -2.41 4.5 
% IOU (ln) 480 5.08 0.21 4.81 5.41 
Electricity Export Ratio (ln) 480 -0.21 0.52 -2.08 1.15 
Per capita GSP (ln) 480 10.22 0.27 9.48 10.93 
% Fossil Fuel Manufacturing (ln) 480 -1.25 1.52 -5.08 2.93 
% Mining (ln) 480 -0.86 1.93 -4.36 3.55 
Sierra Membership (per 1,000, ln) 480 0.56 0.56 -0.83 1.82 
Democrat Governor  480 0.49 0.5 0 1 
LCV House Score 480 48.74 26.62 0 100 
State&Local NR Emp (per million, 
ln) 
480 6.43 0.62 4.75 8.02 
Wind potential (ln) 480 0.86 0.28 0.11 1.51 
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Appendix B. Correlation Analysis of Variables (Pearson r, n=480) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Non-hydro Renewable Electricity (ln) 1.00 
2. Percentage Non-hydro Renewable (ln) 0.74 1.00 
3. All Renewable Energy Policies 0.25 0.26 1.00 
4. Command-and-control  0.27 0.24 0.80 1.00 
5. Market-Based Approach 0.16 0.19 0.92 0.52 1.00 
6. Information Instruments 0.28 0.26 0.63 0.51 0.41 1.00 
7. Wind potential (ln) -0.16 -0.02 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.10 1.00 
8. Per capita GSP (ln) 0.12 0.11 0.45 0.46 0.32 0.37 0.31 1.00 
9. % Fossil Fuel Manufacturing (ln) 0.04 0.08 0.21 0.13 0.21 0.13 0.10 0.21 1.00 
10. % Mining (ln) 0.03 -0.13 -0.32 -0.34 -0.24 -0.21 0.00 -0.36 -0.10 1.00 
11. Sierra Membership (per 1,000) (ln) 0.07 0.26 0.56 0.50 0.43 0.57 0.10 0.43 0.18 -0.37 
12. LCV House Score 0.11 0.32 0.49 0.51 0.38 0.31 0.00 0.33 0.09 -0.59 
13. State&Local NR Emp (per 1,000) (ln) -0.16 0.02 -0.41 -0.46 -0.32 -0.21 0.07 -0.42 -0.11 0.47 
14. Total Electricity Sales (ln) 0.54 -0.10 0.14 0.14 0.09 0.13 -0.26 0.07 -0.08 0.05 
15. Natural Gas Price (ln ) 0.00 -0.02 0.06 0.09 0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.07 0.04 -0.18 
16. Electricity Price (ln) 0.27 0.35 0.52 0.60 0.36 0.33 0.03 0.39 -0.07 -0.53 
17. % Nuclear Power (ln) 0.27 0.10 0.06 0.16 -0.01 0.01 -0.24 0.13 0.10 -0.37 
18. % Hydro Power (ln) 0.11 0.31 0.11 -0.03 0.17 0.08 -0.20 -0.12 0.16 0.03 
19. % IOU (ln) 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 -0.02 -0.04 -0.12 -0.05 0.01 
20. Electricity Export Ratio (ln) -0.06 -0.17 -0.21 -0.16 -0.19 -0.16 0.05 -0.31 0.10 0.46 
 
11 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
1. Non-hydro Renewable Electricity (ln) 
2. Percentage Non-hydro Renewable (ln) 
3. All Renewable Energy Policies 
4. Command-and-control  
5. Market-Based Approach 
6. Information Instruments 
7. Wind potential (ln) 
8. Per capita GSP (ln) 
9. % Fossil Fuel Manufacturing (ln) 
10. % Mining (ln) 
11. Sierra Membership (per 1,000) (ln) 1.00 
12. LCV House Score 0.48 1.00 
13. State&Local NR Emp (per 1,000) (ln) -0.24 -0.39 1.00 
14. Total Electricity Sales (ln) -0.14 -0.13 -0.39 1.00 
15. Natural Gas Price (ln ) 0.01 0.12 -0.10 0.09 1.00 
16. Electricity Price (ln) 0.37 0.62 -0.59 0.07 0.14 1.00 
17. % Nuclear Power (ln) 0.04 0.19 -0.43 0.37 0.11 0.40 1.00 
18. % Hydro Power (ln) 0.28 0.02 0.26 -0.20 -0.06 -0.12 -0.13 1.00 
19. % IOU (ln) 0.03 0.11 -0.09 -0.03 -0.42 0.09 0.01 -0.06 1.00 
20. Electricity Export Ratio (ln) -0.15 -0.19 0.30 -0.19 -0.12 -0.25 -0.15 0.02 -0.02 1.00 
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Appendix C. Transformation of variables 
Dependent Variables: 
MWh of electricity generated from non-hydro renewable sources vs. Ln RE generation 
 
 
Share of non-hydro renewable electricity vs. Ln RE share 
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Appendix D.1 Estimation Issues and Process with Dependent Variable: Ln MWh of 
Renewable Electricity Generation 
 
Pooled OLS vs. random-effects models 
 
 
 
 Fixed- vs. Random-fixed effects: Hausman test 
 
 
 
Cross-sectional correlation test (after fixed-effects regression): xtcsd, pesaran abs 
 
 
 
Heteroskedasticity test: xttest3 
 
 
 
Serial correlation test: xtserial  
 
 
 
Cluster-robust standard error: cluster(fips) 
                          Prob > chi2 =     0.0000
                              chi2(1) =   997.39
        Test:   Var(u) = 0
                       u     .6225506       .7890187
                       e     .1267048       .3559562
               ln_nhyd~e      1.36683       1.169115
                                                       
                                 Var     sd = sqrt(Var)
        Estimated results:
        ln_nhydro_re[fips,t] = Xb + u[fips] + e[fips,t]
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
                          =       85.41
                 chi2(27) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
Average absolute value of the off-diagonal elements =     0.427
 
Pesaran's test of cross sectional independence =    -0.817, Pr = 0.4137
Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
chi2 (48)  =    1564.07
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i
in fixed effect regression model
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity
           Prob > F =      0.0000
    F(  1,      47) =     95.082
H0: no first-order autocorrelation
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
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Appendix D.2 Estimation Issues and Process with Dependent Variable: Ln Share of 
Renewable Electricity Generation 
 
Pooled OLS vs. random-effects models: xttest0 
 
 
 
 Fixed- vs. Random-fixed effects: Hausman test 
 
 
 
Cross-sectional correlation test (after fixed-effects regression): xtcsd, pesaran abs 
 
 
 
Heteroskedasticity test: xttest3 
 
 
 
Serial correlation test: xtserial  
 
 
 
Cluster-robust standard error: cluster(fips) 
 
 
                          Prob > chi2 =     0.0000
                              chi2(1) =   879.80
        Test:   Var(u) = 0
                       u     .4674381       .6836945
                       e     .1154657       .3398025
               ln_nhyd~t     .8662296       .9307146
                                                       
                                 Var     sd = sqrt(Var)
        Estimated results:
        ln_nhydro_percent[fips,t] = Xb + u[fips] + e[fips,t]
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
                          =       85.79
                 chi2(27) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
Average absolute value of the off-diagonal elements =     0.441
 
Pesaran's test of cross sectional independence =    -0.481, Pr = 0.6305
Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
chi2 (48)  =    2040.87
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i
in fixed effect regression model
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity
           Prob > F =      0.0000
    F(  1,      47) =    115.887
H0: no first-order autocorrelation
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
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Appendix E.1Regression Results of Total Amount of Renewable Electricity Generation: 
OLS, RE, FE, and FE with cluster-robust S.E. 
MWh Renewable Electricity 
Generation (Ln) 
OLS RE FE FE w. Cluster-robust S.E. 
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. 
Cluster-
robust 
S.E. 
Command-and-control  
-0.027 0.044 0.106 0.035*** 0.156 0.035*** 0.156 0.057*** 
Market-Based Approach 
-0.060 0.021*** -0.053 0.016*** -0.033 0.016** -0.033 0.026 
Information Instruments 0.235 0.078*** 0.107 0.061* 0.139 0.061** 0.139 0.116 
Wind potential (ln) 0.046 0.159 0.509 0.108*** 0.559 0.106*** 0.559 0.182*** 
Per capita GSP (ln) 0.118 0.190 1.301 0.272*** 1.955 0.325*** 1.955 0.819** 
% Fossil Fuel Manufacturing (ln) 0.068 0.028** 0.011 0.043 0.042 0.048 0.042 0.070 
% Mining (ln) 0.047 0.031 0.101 0.038*** 0.050 0.043 0.050 0.049 
Sierra Membership/1,000 (ln) 
-0.023 0.119 0.502 0.184*** 1.116 0.252*** 1.116 0.400*** 
Democrat Governor  0.044 0.079 0.117 0.050** 0.128 0.049*** 0.128 0.090 
LCV House Score 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 
State&Local NR Emp/million (ln) 0.579 0.095*** 0.122 0.136 -0.123 0.160 -0.123 0.226 
Total Electricity Sales (ln) 1.071 0.070*** 1.032 0.177*** 3.322 0.818*** 3.322 1.382** 
Natural Gas Price (ln ) 
-1.589 0.534*** 0.474 0.312 0.589 0.302* 0.589 0.307* 
Electricity Price (ln) 0.820 0.113*** -0.126 0.113 -0.048 0.123 -0.048 0.188 
% Nuclear Power (ln) 0.096 0.071 0.184 0.180 0.289 0.415 0.289 0.546 
% Hydro Power (ln) 0.149 0.026*** 0.105 0.055* 0.043 0.082 0.043 0.088 
% IOU (ln) 1.081 0.394*** 0.511 0.256** 0.393 0.254 0.393 0.357 
Electricity Export Ratio (ln) 0.066 0.088 0.134 0.137 0.201 0.165 0.201 0.171 
Year 2002 
-0.039 0.175 0.077 0.085 0.002 0.084 0.002 0.091 
Year 2003 0.312 0.169* 0.056 0.085 -0.113 0.087 -0.113 0.088 
Year 2004 0.899 0.241*** 0.224 0.141 -0.100 0.147 -0.100 0.182 
Year 2005 1.118 0.273*** 0.166 0.160 -0.224 0.170 -0.224 0.209 
Year 2006 1.018 0.244*** 0.337 0.147** -0.067 0.162 -0.067 0.214 
Year 2007 1.051 0.246*** 0.367 0.154** -0.097 0.179 -0.097 0.243 
Year 2008 0.982 0.210*** 0.403 0.131*** 0.037 0.150 0.037 0.197 
Year 2009 0.716 0.189*** 0.880 0.119*** 0.678 0.134*** 0.678 0.219*** 
Year 2010 0.925 0.189*** 1.011 0.128*** 0.677 0.156*** 0.677 0.247*** 
Constant 
-6.368 5.242 -26.321 5.260*** -73.530 14.807 -73.530 23.220 
R square 0.5585  0.3414  0.6103  0.6103  
Adjusted R square 0.5322    0.5390  0.5390  
Number of observations 480  480  480  480  
F or Wald chi2 21.28  575.34  23.49  7.05  
p-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Df 27  27  74  26  
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Appendix E.2 Regression Results of Share of Renewable Electricity Generation: OLS, 
RE, FE, and FE with cluster-robust S.E. 
Share of Renewable Electricity 
Generation (Ln) OLS RE FE 
FE w. Cluster-robust 
S.E. 
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. 
Cluster-
robust 
S.E. 
Command-and-control  -0.059 0.040 0.051 0.033 0.102 0.034*** 0.102 0.051** 
Market-Based Approach -0.047 0.019** -0.049 0.015*** -0.031 0.015** -0.031 0.025 
Information Instruments 0.183 0.070*** 0.167 0.058*** 0.204 0.058*** 0.204 0.114* 
Wind potential (ln) 0.111 0.142 0.515 0.104*** 0.577 0.101*** 0.577 0.173*** 
Per capita GSP (ln) -0.246 0.170 1.142 0.255*** 2.035 0.311*** 2.035 0.834** 
% Fossil Fuel Manufacturing (ln) 0.059 0.025** 0.023 0.040 0.054 0.046 0.054 0.064 
% Mining (ln) 0.049 0.028* 0.091 0.036** 0.040 0.041 0.040 0.046 
Sierra Membership/1,000 (ln) 0.136 0.107 0.408 0.171** 0.950 0.240*** 0.950 0.407** 
Democrat Governor  0.000 0.071 0.115 0.048** 0.121 0.046*** 0.121 0.079 
LCV House Score 0.004 0.002** 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 
State&Local NR Emp/million (ln) 0.480 0.085*** 0.196 0.128 -0.014 0.153 -0.014 0.252 
Total Electricity Sales (ln) 0.046 0.063 -0.016 0.157 1.545 0.781** 1.545 1.300 
Natural Gas Price (ln ) -1.413 0.477*** 0.445 0.299 0.605 0.288** 0.605 0.288** 
Electricity Price (ln) 0.773 0.101*** -0.097 0.107 -0.079 0.118 -0.079 0.212 
% Nuclear Power (ln) 0.125 0.064* 0.217 0.160 0.086 0.396 0.086 0.522 
% Hydro Power (ln) 0.146 0.023*** 0.101 0.051** -0.007 0.079 -0.007 0.068 
% IOU (ln) 0.933 0.352*** 0.304 0.245 0.207 0.242 0.207 0.334 
Electricity Export Ratio (ln) -0.376 0.079*** -0.413 0.128*** -0.452 0.157*** -0.452 0.169*** 
Year 2002 -0.033 0.156 0.049 0.082 -0.014 0.080 -0.014 0.080 
Year 2003 0.296 0.151* 0.040 0.082 -0.125 0.083 -0.125 0.079 
Year 2004 0.827 0.215*** 0.142 0.134 -0.166 0.141 -0.166 0.153 
Year 2005 1.052 0.244*** 0.099 0.153 -0.279 0.163* -0.279 0.178 
Year 2006 0.974 0.218*** 0.249 0.140* -0.139 0.155 -0.139 0.182 
Year 2007 1.046 0.220*** 0.290 0.147** -0.154 0.171 -0.154 0.210 
Year 2008 0.966 0.188*** 0.356 0.124*** 0.009 0.144 0.009 0.193 
Year 2009 0.729 0.169*** 0.792 0.113*** 0.617 0.128*** 0.617 0.207*** 
Year 2010 0.922 0.169*** 0.912 0.121*** 0.619 0.149*** 0.619 0.236*** 
Constant 2.515 4.687 -18.386 4.887 -54.738 14.135 -54.738 22.119 
R square 0.4431  0.1153  0.5810  0.5810  
Adjusted R square 0.4098    0.5045  0.5045  
Number of observations 480  480  480  480  
F or Wald chi2 13.32  479.43  20.80  5.00  
p-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Df 27  27  74  26  
 
 
